I got a copy of the actual message from Alex; it's a classic case of BEC (Business Email Compromise).

The sender's email account was compromised due to being successfully phished or similarly via session hijacking (evilginx).

TA then used the credentials and/or hijacked session to send email auth'ed as the user via MAPI to the org's Exchange Online tenant, it was sent to their Mimecast (due to connectors/transport rules), and then out to whoever the recipient's are (in this case, Alex), with a password protected encrypted PDF that contains a fake Docusign image and docsend URL redirect to a phishing domain.

Phishing IOCs for whoever needs them:

irvinsahnimd[.]com

hxxps://docsend[.]com/view/wcnf57yegepy82ny


- Mark Alley


On 12/6/2024 7:33 AM, Alex Shakhov | SH Consulting via mailop wrote:
I was also wondering if it was something like this... See the header below. The spoofed domain was modified and replaced with 'example.com <http://example.com>'.

========

Delivered-To: a...@theshcompany.com
Received: by 2002:a05:6020:ac0d:b0:310:9e0c:1a53 with SMTP id nx13csp334454wdb;
        Wed, 4 Dec 2024 07:35:38 -0800 (PST)
X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=2; ajvyccuqmynvi+2w9ko+zj11b+uh9sid1biehwiv4lxmglylhbw+dlpzhnneuewrp6g5l...@theshcompany.com <mailto:ajvyccuqmynvi%2b2w9ko%2bzj11b%2buh9sid1biehwiv4lxmglylhbw%2bdlpzhnneuewrp6g5l...@theshcompany.com> X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IEUzyxkjDOfi7ff9PowG2PSRsWeRIHT1065GDjnXAWZGBQC4tsVUEdH4FYA36B/ea1aI/bQ X-Received: by 2002:a05:622a:1a25:b0:461:4150:aaf4 with SMTP id d75a77b69052e-4670c06ec55mr70133971cf.11.1733326537662;
        Wed, 04 Dec 2024 07:35:37 -0800 (PST)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1733326537; cv=none;
        d=google.com <http://google.com>; s=arc-20240605;
b=C3s2/7kaXEOo7VkGGsVqVFwoWufRxUuOROevlDoJv4FQNU1tNNxlZiBJ8pa0vzeMpX
 OpVkMoGmloUCON4qhbS9pJJpnXoK45r0LBooO2EVizoT6I3AuTBiW3dBFmZKxxmGj4Uy
 HcyrLjNV+jp446YCiutjLY0OCKnnUTs2Kaelfwg0AhG8whaiD7hGkw/Qk1gA1lfkCG8G
 sw+6UHJ4UY0CUnIgUkKi3a233tV93ciF6yA6zKM+WqKjVSgVx3n+w9vf9lqVqmoqXqaN
 tKSRhiLMbUWsNuH8Idr9NB+3AUP51oGj1r3qRDZrG6Ihf9PZiXJPaMgJdEMQnRKrk4bg
         B4+Q==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com <http://google.com>; s=arc-20240605;
h=content-language:mime-version:accept-language:message-id:date
         :thread-index:thread-topic:subject:from;
        bh=L9a15PF6bcK2nYCDvi+01a+IUoLHQgAvMPDicMMzSQI=;
        fh=47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU=;
b=fzWL7VxZynDqlKwrz+r0AQJmYwHn/bGu7PEbi8//9ckp2v/a0r0upZKxWp7aD29AIV
 BjXqNjK5+nJ6LCxL8kj0xxg9ySKL1+U99eGmBV9w+DLdo09qBRY4IeDNu4N9xCqbam3e
 9Ow8JUe1iPj4srQORMtudXeaMnEuBvCEGibRooa4Z35Or3g3Fu2MkxwPbcMB97GOJK/Y
 rUJHVCc/2NzSdnz5dOMTUJZv0/a06jtanrtJvCHEjXqa6a91YFj8+tLWzfyhaNIm9vwM
 09eW+aqCXowBq+PrB92mnycdK9NwpUAy4bqyoFVFnvOVtVvsfa8Iz3SGI7VIFa7jhZ11
         B9Yw==;
        dara=google.com <http://google.com>
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com <http://mx.google.com>;
       spf=pass (google.com <http://google.com>: domain of pmoll...@example.com designates 170.10.133.179 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=pmoll...@example.com;        dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=example.com <http://example.com>
Return-Path: <pmoll...@example.com>
Received: from us-smtp-delivery-179.mimecast.com <http://us-smtp-delivery-179.mimecast.com> (us-smtp-delivery-179.mimecast.com <http://us-smtp-delivery-179.mimecast.com>. [170.10.133.179])         by mx.google.com <http://mx.google.com> with ESMTPS id d75a77b69052e-466c4258d83si167796611cf.595.2024.12.04.07.35.37
        for <a...@theshcompany.com>
        (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256);
        Wed, 04 Dec 2024 07:35:37 -0800 (PST)
Received-SPF: pass (google.com <http://google.com>: domain of pmoll...@example.com designates 170.10.133.179 as permitted sender) client-ip=170.10.133.179;
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com <http://mx.google.com>;
       spf=pass (google.com <http://google.com>: domain of pmoll...@example.com designates 170.10.133.179 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=pmoll...@example.com;        dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=example.com <http://example.com>

===========

Best,
Alex


On Fri, Dec 6, 2024 at 2:11 PM Faisal Misle <fai...@emailgeek.eu> wrote:

    I'd love to see redacted headers. I wonder if it's similar to the
    Proofpoint bypass that was in the news a few cycles ago where any 365
    tenant can email through companies that have PFPT setup.

    On 12/6/24 1:43 PM, Alex Shakhov | SH Consulting via mailop wrote:
    > Hello, a few months ago, I was asked to audit emails and
    integrate a new
    > system for a company. The first thing I did was configure DMARC
    > reporting (replaced v=DMARC1; p=none;) and after two months of
    analyzing
    > their email traffic, I detected some spoofing activity along with a
    > messy SPF record and a misconfigured DKIM setup for Mimecast,
    which they
    > use to route outbound emails. The spoofed traffic was small,
    just <10
    > emails over two months.
    >
    > I reached out to their team and suggested adding the missing DKIM,
    > cleaning up their SPF record, and enforcing DMARC. I supported my
    > recommendations with detailed documentation and report. However,
    instead
    > of collaborating, they silently revoked my DNS access, removed
    the DMARC
    > policy I had set up, implemented the missing DKIM records, and
    > configured a free Postmark DMARC record. They then set the DMARC
    policy
    > to reject. The SPF record remained unchanged.
    >
    > A week later, I received a spoofed email from their domain with an
    > encrypted attachment. Surprisingly, my Google Workspace didn’t
    filter
    > it, and it landed directly in my inbox. I figured out that
    >
    > - The 'To' field was empty.
    > - DMARC was set to reject, but the email passed validation.
    > - SPF passed with 170.10.133.179 (a Mimecast relay).
    > - DKIM was missing.
    >
    > Their SPF record was still a complete mess, packed with
    unnecessary IPs
    > and services, although within the 10 DNS lookup limit. I have
    strong
    > reasons to believe that the combination of their improperly
    configured
    > SPF record and Mimecast's SEG setup allowed these spoofed emails to
    > appear legitimate and bypass filtering.
    >
    > I can’t say with 100% certainty that my explanation covers
    everything,
    > but this is definitely one version worth considering.
    >
    > For reference, here’s their SPF record:
    >
    > v=spf1 include:us._netblocks.mimecast.com
    <http://netblocks.mimecast.com> <http://
    > netblocks.mimecast.com/
    <http://netblocks.mimecast.com/>> include:spf.protection.outlook.com
    <http://spf.protection.outlook.com> <http://
    > spf.protection.outlook.com/
    <http://spf.protection.outlook.com/>> ip4:207.46.163.247
    ip4:74.126.9.238
    > ip4:72.52.238.74 ip4:207.158.48.193/26 <http://207.158.48.193/26>
    > <http://207.158.48.193/26> ip4:209.216.210.32/28
    <http://209.216.210.32/28>
    > <http://209.216.210.32/28> ip4:198.37.147.129
    > include:support.zendesk.com <http://support.zendesk.com>
    <http://support.zendesk.com/
    >  > include:amazonses.com <http://amazonses.com>
    <http://amazonses.com/> include:_spf.smtp.com <http://spf.smtp.com>
    > <http://spf.smtp.com/> ~all
    >
    > Thank you for your attention.
    >
    > _______________________________________________
    > mailop mailing list
    > mailop@mailop.org
    > https://list.mailop.org/listinfo/mailop


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