Numa iniciativa conjunta da Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica e do Grupo de Interesse em Lógica da Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, gostaríamos de convidar a todos a participarem do Seminário "Lógicos em Quarentena". Trata-se de um seminário remoto com apresentações informais por membros da comunidade e espaço para perguntas no fim. As apresentações usualmente são gravadas e disponibilizadas na página do evento http://lq.sbl.org.br (com a agenda completa).
Data: 08 de julho de 2021 (quinta-feira) Horário: 14:00h GMT-3 Apresentador: Tero Tulenheimo (CNRS-STL & Université de Lille) Título: Objects and Modalities Resumo: I describe a generalization of possible world semantics, called ‘world line semantics’. The approach is the result of my critical assessment of ideas initially proposed by Hintikka in 1960s. Crucially, I recognize worlds and links between world-bound objects (world lines, individuals) as mutually independent aspects of modal semantics. The two factors are indeed independent: even if one describes worlds in the minutest detail, one will not have even touched the question of which individuals are defined over those worlds. A basic set of local objects is postulated. Worlds partition this set in one way, world lines in another way. The framework is motivated philosophically, by viewing a structure of world lines as a precondition of modal talk. The framework allows even providing a uniform analysis of quantification over individuals (physical objects) and objects of thought (intentional objects). What is proposed is a radically new paradigm in modal semantics. The adopted understanding of individuals is diametrically opposed to Kripke’s and Kaplan’s popular views; their notions of rigid designator and direct reference are predicated on the assumption that literally one and the same thing can itself reside in various worlds. If attention is confined to a single temporally extended world, then individuals (world lines) in my sense are four-dimensional like individuals in Lewis’s sense and local objects are time-bound like temporal parts of individuals are according to Lewis. However, according to Lewis, any difference between two worlds is grounded in differences in their local qualities, and counterpart relations between denizens of distinct worlds are supervenient on world-internal qualitative considerations (Humean supervenience). My position is explicitly antithetical to such a view, given the mutual independence of worlds and world lines—local features of a context cannot give rise to anything that presupposes cross-context identity. A apresentação ocorrerá pelo Google Meet através do link público http://meet.google.com/mmp-nuvx-xby . -- Bruno Lopes Professor Adjunto Instituto de Computação Universidade Federal Fluminense http://www.ic.uff.br/~bruno -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para logica-l+unsubscr...@dimap.ufrn.br. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/CAD-Wq0_D7QknJhxrB27pQKEN8By9XYf-Es0XJKajYaG6AM24rQ%40mail.gmail.com.