Dear Cheerful Logicians and Friends of Logic,

There are lots of talks this week. Things seem to start winding down after
that. Be sure to stop by next week, though, for the last official
supergroup talk of the year!

Details on the various goings on this week can be found below.

Supergroup Talk:



Speaker: Daniel Găină

Title: Forcing and Calculi for Hybrid Logics

Time and Date: Thursday, December 3rd, 19:00 GMT-6

Link: <https://ksu.zoom.us/j/7613620942>
https://ksu.zoom.us/j/96608715294?pwd=elFFaVQ3Q0pwbzJScDZOWkhYRGlzdz09

*Meeting ID*: 966 0871 5294

*Passcode*: calculi

Abstract: The definition of institution formalizes the intuitive notion of
logic in a category-based setting. Similarly, the concept of stratified
institution provides an abstract approach to Kripke semantics. This
includes hybrid logics, a type of modal logics expressive enough to allow
references to the nodes/states/worlds of the models regarded as relational
structures, or multi-graphs. Applications of hybrid logics involve many
areas of research, such as computational linguistics, transition systems,
knowledge representation, artificial intelligence, biomedical informatics,
semantic networks, and ontologies. The present contribution sets a unified
foundation for developing formal verification methodologies to reason about
Kripke structures by defining proof calculi for a multitude of hybrid
logics in the framework of stratified institutions. To prove completeness,
the article introduces a forcing technique for stratified institutions with
nominal and frame extraction and studies a forcing property based on
syntactic consistency. The proof calculus is shown to be complete and the
significance of the general results is exhibited on a couple of benchmark
examples of hybrid logical systems.



Talks by Member Groups:


*Helsinki Logic Seminar*



Speaker: Miika Hannula

Title: On the Complexity of Horn and Krom Fragments of Second-Order Boolean
Logic

Time and Date: Wednesday, December 2nd 4:00 (GMT-6)

Link:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/4762106037?pwd=ckc1UzhDSHJmQ3I2bEpmNjNWcDNsZz09

Abstract: Dependency quantified Boolean formulae (DQBF) provide a canonical
complete problem for non-deterministic exponential time. Restricted to Horn
formulae this problem, then known as DQHORN, collapses to standard Horn
satisfiability and is thus solvable in polynomial time. In this talk we
isolate DQHORN as a fragment of second-order Boolean logic over CNF
formulae with restrictions on clause and term structure. In particular, we
consider whether some of the restrictions inherited from DQHORN can be
loosened without increase in complexity. As a result, we obtain a
complexity classification for various fragments of second-order Boolean
logic.


*Proof Theory Seminar*


*Speaker: *Ulrich Kohlenbach

*Title: *Proof Mining and the "Lion-Man" game

*Time and Date: *Wednesday, December 2nd 11:00 (GMT-6)

*Link: *see
https://www.proofsociety.org/proof-theory-seminar/participate.html

*Abstract: *We analyze, based on an interplay between ideas and techniques
from logic and geometric analysis, a pursuit-evasion game. More precisely,
we focus on a discrete lion and man game with an epsilon-capture
criterion.We prove that in uniformly convex bounded domains the lion always
wins and, using ideas stemming from proof mining, we extract a uniform rate
of convergence for the successive distances between the lion and the man.
As a byproduct of our analysis, we study the relation among different
convexity properties in the setting of geodesic spaces.
(Joint work with Genaro López-Acedo and Adriana Nicolae.)

*Colloquium Logicae*

*Speaker: *David Fuenmayor

*Title: *Generalized topological semantics for weak negations and
applications to the analysis of Gödel's incompleteness theorem

*Time and Date: *Wednesday, December 2nd 13:00 (GMT-6)

*Link: *https://conferenciaweb.rnp.br/spaces/unicamp-cle-colloquium-logicae

*Abstract: *This talk is divided into two parts. First, I introduce a
sort of generalized topological semantics for paraconsistent and
paracomplete (e.g. intuitionistic) logics by drawing upon early works on
topological Boolean algebras (cf. Kuratowski, Zarycki, McKinsey & Tarski).
In the second part, I present some preliminary joint work with Walter
Carnielli [1] which formalizes the 'last mile' of the proof of Gödel's
incompleteness theorem using some weak paraconsistent
Logics of Formal Inconsistency (a special case of the logics discussed in
the first part). All presented results have been obtained with help of the
proof assistant Isabelle/HOL. The idea is to motivate a (hopefully lively)
discussion on the use of automated reasoning with non-classical logics in
the formalization and (re)interpretation of influential meta-mathematical
results.

[1] W. Carnielli, D. Fuenmayor (2020). Gödel blooming: the
incompleteness theorems from a paraconsistent perspective. Preprint. Vol.
19 No. 4 (2020) CLE e-prints
(https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/CLE_e-Prints/issue/view/243)


*LIRa/GroLog (a two part event!)*

*Talk #1:*

*Speaker: *Zoé Christoff (University of Groningen)

*Title: *Group Knowledge in Epistemic Logic with Names

*Time and Date: *Thursday, December 3rd 8:30 (GMT-6)

*Link: *
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09

*Abstract: *In many situations, we refer to a group of agents using a
label, say "Trump supporters" or "trolls", without knowing exactly who the
members of the group are. Sometimes, we even fail to know whether we,
ourselves, are members of a given group. Yet, epistemic logic typically
comes with the simplifying assumption that group membership is common
knowledge among the entire population. In 1993 already, Grove and Halpern
introduced a generalized epistemic logic relaxing this assumption and
replacing the usual indexes to denote agents with abstract names that can
have different referents, both individuals or groups, in different possible
worlds. In that generalized framework, they replace the standard K_i
modalities with modalities of the form S_n and E_n, for "someone with name
n knows" and "everyone with name n knows", respectively. In our current
work, we discuss extensions of this generalized logic with group modalities
for common knowledge and distributed knowledge.
(joint work with Marta Bílková and Olivier Roy)

Reference: A. J. Grove and J. Y. Halpern. Naming and Identity in Epistemic
Logics Part I: The Propositional Case. Journal of Logic and Computation,
3(4):345–378, 08, 1993


*Talk #2:*

*Speaker: *Aybüke Özgün (University of Amsterdam)

*Title: *Uncertainty about Evidence

*Time and Date: *Thursday, December 3rd 9:45 (GMT-6)

*Link: *
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09

*Abstract: *We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge
and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret
their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed
subset of the state space, our models allow the set of possible worlds that
a piece of evidence corresponds to to vary from one possible world to
another, and therefore itself be the subject of uncertainty. Such
structures can be viewed as (epistemically motivated) generalizations of
topological spaces. In this context, there arises a natural distinction
between what is actually entailed by the evidence and what the agent knows
is entailed by the evidence---with the latter, in general, being much
weaker. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the corresponding
bi-modal logic of knowledge and evidence entailment, and investigate some
natural extensions of this core system, including the addition of a belief
modality and its interaction with evidence interpretation and entailment,
and the addition of a “knowability" modality interpreted via a
(generalized) interior operator.

This is joint work with Adam Bjorndahl.


*Lógicos em Quarentena*

*Speaker: *Stéphane Graham-Lengrand

*Title: *Realisability semantics of abstract focussing

*Time and Date: *Thursday, December 3rd 13:00 (GMT-6)

*Link: *https://meet.google.com/rfg-frdp-nxb

*Abstract: *We present a sequent calculus for abstract focussing, as a
highly parametric typing system for proof-terms. In the tradition of
Zeilberger's work, logical connectives and their introduction rules are
left as parameters, collapsing the synchronous and asynchronous phases of
focussing as macro rules. Further parameterisation of context extension
makes standard classical and intuitionistic focussed sequent calculi
instances of the abstract one. We then define the realisability semantics
of the system, on the basis of Munch-Maccagnoni's orthogonality models for
the classical focussed sequent calculus, but now operating at the higher
level of abstraction mentioned above. The Adequacy Lemma can be proved at
that level: if a term is of type A, then its denotation in the
realisability model is in the (set-theoretic) interpretation of A. The
proof explicitly connects two forms of universal quantification: on the
semantic side, the universal quantification involved when taking the
orthogonal of a set; and on the syntactic side, the universal
quantification involved in the macro rule for the asynchronous phase. The
system and its semantics are all formalised in Coq.

*UConn Logic Group*

*Speaker: *Nadine Theiler

*Title: *An Epistemic Bridge for Presupposition Projection in Questions

*Time and Date: *Friday, December 4th 13:00 (GMT-6)

*Link: *
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87145334762?pwd=QjV0RmR2ejAwVnBMbDExcDJLZitpdz09
*Meeting ID*: 871 4533 4762
*Passcode*: presup

*Abstract: *Semantic presuppositions are certain inferences associated with
words or linguistic constructions. For example, if someone tells you that
they “recently started doing yoga”, then this presupposes that they didn’t
do yoga before.

A problem that has occupied semanticists for decades is how the
presuppositions of a complex sentence can be computed from the
presuppositions of its parts. Another way of putting this problem is, how
do presuppositions project in various environments?

In this talk, I will discuss presupposition projection in one particular
linguistic environment, namely in questions, arguing that it should be
treated pragmatically. I will motivate a generalized version of Stalnaker’s
bridge principle and show that it makes correct predictions for a range of
different interrogative forms and different question uses.


Other Notes and Announcements:

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   To access the supergroup calendar, please follow this link:
   
https://calendar.google.com/calendar?cid=ZGhoanNoanF1bGhmaG9xam5scDJlc2o0bDhAZ3JvdXAuY2FsZW5kYXIuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbQ
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   To access the member groups joint calendar, please follow this link:
   
https://calendar.google.com/calendar?cid=aG8wNWljaGxkNXI2N2oyMnZvY3BzdmRoMWNAZ3JvdXAuY2FsZW5kYXIuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbQ
   -

   If you represent a member group and would like your events to appear on
   the joint calendar, be sure to add them! Contact any of the organizers if
   you need permission to do so.



Yay for logic!

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