Dear Cheerful Philosophers, A correction! The url for Sarah Uckleman's talk that I sent around was incorrect. The correct URL is the following:
Zoom Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84543094782?pwd=OGtNZG93QkRKRkkwNnBZQVZsVlBHQT09 <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fus02web.zoom.us%2Fj%2F84543094782%3Fpwd%3DOGtNZG93QkRKRkkwNnBZQVZsVlBHQT09&data=02%7C01%7C%7C28a5230035364887c6ce08d853fa7c67%7C17f1a87e2a254eaab9df9d439034b080%7C0%7C0%7C637351682573791509&sdata=Zi0axQreeHur9fjk0lTn2v0vmRQJEVNJgf1%2FV2S09Fc%3D&reserved=0> Password: syllogism I will send a reminder to this effect right before her talk as well. Shay On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 10:12 PM Shay Logan <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Cheerful Logicians and Friends of Logic, > > A quick reminder before we get to the details: The Buenos Aires Logic > Group is hosting the second half of their ninth annual Workshop on > Philosophical Logic on September 10 & 11. Check out > https://www.ba-logic.com/workshops/ for more info. > > This week we again have a bounty of talks! In addition to the Buenos Aires > Workshop, we also have one talk on Tuesday, one talk on Wednesday, two > talks on Thursday, and two talks on Friday. All the details below can be > found on either the main calendar or the member groups calendar on the > supergroup website, which you can find at > https://sites.google.com/view/logicsupergroup/. > > Details about all of these talks are also found below. > > Supergroup Talk Number 1: > > > > Speaker: Sophia Knight (University of Minnesota-Duluth) > > Title: Some work on strategy logic with imperfect information > > Time and Date: Thursday, September 10 20:00GMT-5 > > Link: > https://unimelb.zoom.us/j/846890369?pwd=TktZYmlIUGlYOU9ZaXFJcCt0TFJFZz09 > > Abstract: There is a great deal of work on logics for games in > multi-agent systems. These logics are concerned with formally defining > statements like "If Alice and Bob cooperate, they can follow a strategy so > that they are certain to achieve their goal," or "no matter what Cath does, > she cannot be sure of achieving her goal," or "Alice can ensure that either > Bob is certain not to reach his goal, no matter what he does, or Cath is > cerain to reach her goal if she follows the right strategy." My talk will > be focused on how to include imperfect information in these systems: if the > agents do not have full information about the current state of the system, > how does this change their power to act strategically in order to achieve > their goals? In particular, I will discuss my current work with Bastien > Maubert on some approaches to the formal expression of agents' knowledge > and strategic abilities in multi-agent systems with imperfect information. > > > I will begin by presenting Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), a logic > describing the abilities of coalitions of agents in concurrent game > structures. I will describe some difficulties with adapting variants of ATL > to imperfect information settings. Next I will introduce Strategy Logic > (SL), a logic with a similar purpose to ATL, which differs in that it takes > strategies to be explicit objects in the logic, making it more powerful but > less decidable than ATL. For example, SL can state the existence of Nash > equilibria, whereas ATL cannot. I will describe our current work on an > imperfect information variant of SL, the addition of epistemic operators, > the difficulties in restricting SL to only consider uniform strategies, and > a solution to this difficulty. > > > Supergroup Talk Number 2: > > > > Speaker: Sara Uckelman (Durham) > > Title: What Problem Did Ladd-Franklin (Think She) Solve(d)? > > Time and Date: Friday, September 11 10:00GMT-5 > > Link: > https://ksu.zoom.us/j/94305374304?pwd=cjArb1lNNjJXRGF2d3BTbGwvYmxzdz09 > > *Meeting ID: *943 0537 4304 > > *Passcode: *ThinkShe > > Abstract: Christine Ladd-Franklin is often hailed as a guiding star in > the history of women in logic—not only did she study under C.S. Peirce and > was one of the first women to receive a PhD from Johns Hopkins, she also, > according to many modern commentators, solved a logical problem which had > plagued the field of syllogisms since Aristotle. In this paper, we revisit > this claim, posing and answering two distinct questions: Which logical > problem did Ladd-Franklin solve in her thesis, and which problem did she > \emph{think} she solved? We show that in neither case is the answer ``a > long-standing problem due to Aristotle''. Instead, what Ladd-Franklin > solved was a problem due to Jevons that was first articulated in the 19th > century. > > > > Talks by Other Groups: > > > *Colloquium Logicae & OCIE* > > *Speaker: *Alfredo Roque Freire (Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the > History of Science University of Campinas-Unicamp, Brazil) > > *Title: *Intentional theory dichotomy and twisted models of set theory > > *Time and Date: *Tuesday, September 8 18:00GMT-5 > > *Link: *https://uci.zoom.us/j/95859575948 > > *Abstract: *Two modes of description were familiar to modern > mathematicians: (i) descriptions of mathematical types to be satisfied by > various structures, such as rings, fields, monoids; and (ii) intentional > descriptions, which seek to specify mathematical objects as in geometry, > arithmetic and real analysis. Due to the various limiting theorems in > relation to formal systems (e.g. G\"odel's incompleteness and > Loweinhein-Skolem theorems), it has become common to maintain that there is > no sharp boundary between intentional and non-intentional theories. Since > it is not possible to fix a single model for first order arithmetic, its > axioms work in a similar way to axioms of general algebraic structures. > This conclusion is the result of the following dichotomy: either there are > precise and unambiguous ways to describe general collections of objects or > there is no clear boundary between intentional theories and non-intentional > theories. However, recent results on interpretability [1,2,3] develop > restricted versions of absoluteness regarding theories historically > considered to be intentional. In fact, models of arithmetic and set theory > are unique > with respect to bi-interpretations. We will argue that these results allow > us not only to recover the dichotomy that separates intentional from > non-intentional theories, but still remain compatible with pluralism > regarding theories such as arithmetic and set theory. > > Finally, we will show to what extent conditions of absoluteness may be > used as sufficient to incorporate non-classical set theories to the > multiverse. We believe this absoluteness conditions are possibly obtained > for the novel twisted valued models developed by Carnielli and Coniglio > [4]. We will argue that these paraconsistent models have the virtue of > being sufficiently rigid, and thus may be successfully included in the > multiverse. > > [1] Friedman, H. M., & Visser, A. (2014). When bi-interpretability implies > synonymy. Logic Group Preprint Series, 320, 1-19. > > [2] Enayat, A. (2017). Variations on a Visserian theme. arXiv preprin > arXiv:1702.07093. > > [3] Freire, A. R., & Hamkins, J. D. (2020). Bi-interpretation in weak set > theories. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05262. > > [4] Carnielli, W., & Coniglio, M. E. (2019). Twist-valued models for > three-valued paraconsistent set theory. > Logic and Logical Philosophy,, ON LINE FIRST: > https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/LLP/article/view/LLP.2020.015 > > > *Indiana University Logic Group* > > > Speaker: Sergei Artemov (Graduate Center CUNY) > > Title: The Provability of Consistency > > Time and Date: Wednesday, September 9 15:00GMT-5 > > Link: > https://iu.zoom.us/j/95326399432?pwd=VmVUWGxHeG5KQjEzQVozb3pCRHJVZz09 > > Abstract: We argue that there is a class of widely used informal > arithmetical reasonings which are not captured by the standard notion of a > formal proof of a formula in Peano Arithmetic PA but yet are naturally > formalizable in PA. Specifically, informal “contentual” arithmetic can > prove a property S (think of the "strong induction" property) without > reducing S to a single formula. On this basis, we offer a mathematical > proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic PA in its original Hilbert's > formulation as a property of finite sequences of formulas and demonstrate > that this proof is formalizable in PA. Our consistency proof is not ruled > out by Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem which prohibits only PA-proofs > of the internalized PA-consistency presented as a specific arithmetical > formula. > > > The above renders the popular impossibility reading of Gödel's Theorem, > that there is no consistency proof of a system that can be formalized > within the system itself, unwarranted. > > > *Lógicos em Quarentena* > > > > Speaker: Diogo Henrique Bispo Dias > > Title: There is no good argument for logical monism > > Time and Date: Thursday, September 10 14:00GMT-5 > > Link: https://meet.google.com/utd-uqvh-txh > > Abstract: The aim of this talk is to investigate some arguments for > logical monism, and to show how, with minor modifications, these arguments > could be used to defend the adequacy of different logics. Hence, as a > defence of logical monism, they all fail. > > > *Nonclassical Logic Seminar* > > > *Speaker: *Francesco Paoli (Cagliari) > > *Title: *On Paraconsistent Weak Kleene Logic > > *Time and Date: *Friday, September 11 11:00GMT-5 > > *Link: *https://udenver.zoom.us/j/96933393328 > > *Abstract: *Paraconsistent Weak Kleene Logic (PWK) is the 3-valued > propositional > logic defined on the weak Kleene tables and with 2 designated values. > In this survey talk, we intend to explore some intriguing connections > between this logic and the algebraic theories of regular varieties and > of Plonka sums over semilattice direct systems of algebras. By a > recourse to this toolbox, it is possible to discover some interesting > properties of PWK from the point of view of Abstract Algebraic Logic. > We also present a Gentzen system for PWK and show that PWK has only > one nontrivial proper extension apart from Classical Logic. > The results we present are due to S. Bonzio, J. Gil Férez, T. > Moraschini, L. Peruzzi, M. Pra Baldi, and the speaker. > > > > Other Notes and Announcements: > > - > > *The Logic Supergroup has a YouTube channel!* Recordings of almost all > talks are available at > https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCqOAS8SHP-5nGjYEE2FE6xw > > > > Yay for logic! > -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para [email protected]. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/CAMTR990cLy7%3DTR3ZQqjD_xffJKxBNrCck6KGmU2wh%3DGC2xX5yQ%40mail.gmail.com.
