Para os interessados em epistemologia: Dois CFP (bem próximos) da Synthese e da Manuscrito.
A propósito, o organizador do special issue da Manuscrito, Rodrigo Borges (PUC-RS), foi o responsável por trazer o Ernst Sosa para o último evento da Sociedade Brasileira de Filosofia Analítica. ++++ Synthese welcomes submissions for a special issue on Epistemic Dependence. Epistemology has been traditionally driven by individualistic assumptions. Classical theories of knowledge and justified belief give no or little weight to the fact that, for the most part, our epistemic practices take place in complex social and technological environments, to the point that the success of many of our epistemic endeavors crucially depends on the trust we place on other agents as well as on the information provided by the use of technology. This issue of Synthese aims to explore the phenomenon of epistemic dependence from different angles in its connection with current debates in epistemology. Possible topics: - Does the kind of epistemic dependence involved in testimony obey the same epistemic principles as the sort of epistemic dependence that arises when knowledge or justified beliefs are acquired by relying on instruments? - Is there any significant difference between the internal forms of epistemic dependence that groups or communities seemingly exhibit and the kind of interpersonal dependence established between mere individuals? - Does the way in which a social environment is structured bear on how epistemically permissible is not to rely on one’s individual cognitive faculties? - Does dependence on factors beyond cognitive agency (e.g. deference to experts) compromise the rationality of agents? - Are beliefs epistemically worse off when the relevant cognitive faculties need external aid to produce them? Does this sort of epistemic dependence speak in favor or against specific accounts of knowledge or justified belief (e.g., internalist views, virtue epistemology, anti-luck epistemology)? Please note that the above is a *non-exhaustive* list of possible topics. Submissions on any aspect of the notion of epistemic dependence (in connection with any current debate in epistemology) are welcome. To submit a paper, please log in to Synthese editorial manager ( https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx), click on “Submit New Manuscript”, and choose article type “S.I.: Epistemic Dependence”. The deadline for submissions is December 31, 2016. We are looking forward to your contributions to this issue. Guest editors: Jesús Vega-Encabo Department of Philosophy Autonomous University of Madrid Fernando Broncano-Berrocal Department of Media, Cognition and Communication University of Copenhagen ++++ MANUSCRITO: International Journal of Philosophy, will devote a special issue to epistemology. We invite submissions on any topic in traditional or formal epistemology, broadly construed. The guest editor will be Professor Rodrigo Borges (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil). Confirmed contributors include: - Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh) - Clayton Littlejohn (King’s College London) - Jason Stanley (Yale University) - Fred Adams (University of Delaware) The deadline for the initial submission is 1 July 2017. Accepted papers will be published in 2017. Contact: [email protected] Fernando Broncano-Berrocal Marie Curie Fellow Department of Media, Cognition and Communication University of Copenhagen Karen Blixens Vej 4, Building: 16.1.20 2300 Copenhagen S, DENMARK http://epistemology.ku.dk www.fbroncano-berrocal.com -- Marcos Silva https://sites.google.com/site/marcossilvarj/ Philosophie macht Spaß! -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para [email protected]. Para postar neste grupo, envie um e-mail para [email protected]. Visite este grupo em https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/group/logica-l/. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/CAGZ3pzLPR5vGD4ip-Yu0Nj8LxU-R4%3DX13cYWkwiBaES6JCz-QA%40mail.gmail.com.
