Thank you for the review! On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 8:20 AM Tanushree Shah <[email protected]> wrote: > Thanks, v2 looks right. One concern: the rule infers user vs kernel > from SIAR's address, but a real-mode address (translation off) is also > low, so it can look like a user address. The 0xc00 samples in the > results come out right only because the regs are kernel there. If a > real-mode SIAR ever pairs with user regs, the rule would trust a bogus > address.
It does pair with user regs. On the hash MMU CPUs, a DSI or ISI for a page whose PTE is present but not in the hash table goes to hash_page_dsi/hash_page_isi, which call hash_page() with translation still off and return to user space from fast_hash_page_return. EE is clear the whole way, so if a counter overflows in there, the exception is taken at the first user instruction with SIAR holding the real address of the hash code. I reproduced it on the 7448 with a loop that mprotect()s 2048 pages read-only and back, which flushes their hash PTEs, then reads one word from each page. With -c 10007, 1674 of 2659 user samples landed on the real addresses of DataAccess, hash_page_dsi, hash_page, create_hpte and fast_hash_page_return. My syscall test couldn't have caught this, since it counted those as user addresses in user mode. > This rule avoids it and still fixes the interrupts-off case: > regs->result = siar && !user_mode(regs) && is_kernel_addr(siar); > User samples then use regs->nip, which loses little (SIAR was only ~4 > instructions closer in your table). Agreed. With that, the same test has no user samples at kernel addresses, and 99.9% of the kernel samples still get their address from SIAR. I'll use it in v3 with your Suggested-by. Thanks, Matt
