Breno Leitao <lei...@debian.org> writes: > On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 08:17:42AM +0000, Christophe Leroy wrote: >> +Nathan as this is RTAS related. >> >> Le 21/08/2018 à 20:42, Breno Leitao a écrit : >> > The rtas syscall reads a value from a user-provided structure and uses it >> > to index an array, being a possible area for a potential spectre v1 attack. >> > This is the code that exposes this problem. >> > >> > args.rets = &args.args[nargs]; >> > >> > The nargs is an user provided value, and the below code is an example where >> > the 'nargs' value would be set to XX. >> > >> > struct rtas_args ra; >> > ra.nargs = htobe32(XX); >> > syscall(__NR_rtas, &ra); >> >> >> This patch has been hanging around in patchwork since 2018 and doesn't >> apply anymore. Is it still relevant ? If so, can you rebase et resubmit ? > > This seems to be important, since nargs is a user-provided value. I can > submit it if the maintainers are willing to accept. I do not want to > spend my time if no one is willing to review it.
My memory is that I didn't think it was actually a problem, because all we do is memset args.rets to zero. I thought I'd talked to you on Slack about it, but maybe I didn't. Anyway we should probably just fix it to be safe and keep the static checkers happy. I'll rebase it and apply it, I'm sure you've got better things to do :) cheers
