On 3/26/21 4:11 PM, Christophe Leroy wrote:
[..]
>>>
>>> Dmitry proposed the same, see
>>> https://github.com/0x7f454c46/linux/commit/783c7a2532d2219edbcf555cc540eab05f698d2a
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Discussion at https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/issues/1417
>>
>> Yeah, I didn't submit it officially to lkml because I couldn't test it
>> yet (and I usually don't send untested patches). The VM I have fails to
>> kexec and there's some difficulty to get serial console working, so I'd
>> appreciate if someone could either pick it up, or add tested-by.
>>
>
> Just to let everyone know, while testing your patch with selftest I
> encountered the following Oops. But I also have it without your patch
> thought.
Thank you, Christophe!
>
> root@vgoip:~# ./sigreturn_vdso
> test: sigreturn_vdso
> tags: git_version:v5.12-rc4-1553-gc31141d460e6
> VDSO is at 0x104000-0x10bfff (32768 bytes)
> Signal delivered OK with VDSO mapped
> VDSO moved to 0x77bf4000-0x77bfbfff (32768 bytes)
> Signal delivered OK with VDSO moved
> Unmapped VDSO
> [ 1855.444371] Kernel attempted to read user page (7ff9ff30) - exploit
> attempt? (uid: 0)
> [ 1855.459404] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at
> 0x7ff9ff30
> [ 1855.466188] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00111d4
> [ 1855.471099] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
> [ 1855.476428] BE PAGE_SIZE=16K PREEMPT CMPC885
> [ 1855.480702] SAF3000 DIE NOTIFICATION
> [ 1855.484184] CPU: 0 PID: 362 Comm: sigreturn_vdso Not tainted
> 5.12.0-rc4-s3k-dev-01553-gc31141d460e6 #4811
> [ 1855.493644] NIP: c00111d4 LR: c0005a28 CTR: 00000000
> [ 1855.498634] REGS: cadb3dd0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted
> (5.12.0-rc4-s3k-dev-01553-gc31141d460e6)
> [ 1855.507068] MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 48000884 XER: 20000000
> [ 1855.513866] DAR: 7ff9ff30 DSISR: 88000000
> [ 1855.513866] GPR00: c0007788 cadb3e90 c28dc000 7ff9ff30 7ff9ff40
> 000004e0 7ff9fd50 00000000
> [ 1855.513866] GPR08: 00000001 00000001 7ff9ff30 00000000 28000282
> 1001b7e8 100a0920 00000000
> [ 1855.513866] GPR16: 100cac0c 100b0000 102883a4 10289685 100d0000
> 100d0000 100d0000 100b2e9e
> [ 1855.513866] GPR24: ffffffff 102883c8 00000000 7ff9ff38 cadb3f40
> cadb3ec8 c28dc000 00000000
> [ 1855.552767] NIP [c00111d4] flush_icache_range+0x90/0xb4
> [ 1855.557932] LR [c0005a28] handle_signal32+0x1bc/0x1c4
> [ 1855.562925] Call Trace:
> [ 1855.565332] [cadb3e90] [100d0000] 0x100d0000 (unreliable)
> [ 1855.570666] [cadb3ec0] [c0007788] do_notify_resume+0x260/0x314
> [ 1855.576432] [cadb3f20] [c000c764] syscall_exit_prepare+0x120/0x184
> [ 1855.582542] [cadb3f30] [c00100b4] ret_from_syscall+0xc/0x28
> [ 1855.588050] --- interrupt: c00 at 0xfe807f8
> [ 1855.592183] NIP: 0fe807f8 LR: 10001048 CTR: c0139378
> [ 1855.597174] REGS: cadb3f40 TRAP: 0c00 Not tainted
> (5.12.0-rc4-s3k-dev-01553-gc31141d460e6)
> [ 1855.605607] MSR: 0000d032 <EE,PR,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28000282 XER:
> 20000000
> [ 1855.612664]
> [ 1855.612664] GPR00: 00000025 7ffa0230 77c09690 00000000 0000000a
> 28000282 00000001 0ff03a38
> [ 1855.612664] GPR08: 0000d032 00000328 c28dc000 00000009 88000282
> 1001b7e8 100a0920 00000000
> [ 1855.612664] GPR16: 100cac0c 100b0000 102883a4 10289685 100d0000
> 100d0000 100d0000 100b2e9e
> [ 1855.612664] GPR24: ffffffff 102883c8 00000000 77bff628 10002358
> 10010000 1000210c 00008000
> [ 1855.648894] NIP [0fe807f8] 0xfe807f8
> [ 1855.652426] LR [10001048] 0x10001048
> [ 1855.655954] --- interrupt: c00
> [ 1855.658969] Instruction dump:
> [ 1855.661893] 38630010 7c001fac 38630010 4200fff0 7c0004ac 4c00012c
> 4e800020 7c001fac
> [ 1855.669811] 2c0a0000 38630010 4082ffcc 4bffffe4 <7c00186c> 2c070000
> 39430010 4082ff8c
> [ 1855.677910] ---[ end trace f071a5587092b3aa ]---
> [ 1855.682462]
> Remapped the stack executable
> !! child died by signal 11
> failure: sigreturn_vdso
Yes, it seems unrelated.
Probably, a bit hacky solution to this one could be:
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ int handle_signal32(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t
*oldset,
}
user_write_access_end();
- if (tramp == (unsigned long)mctx->mc_pad)
+ if ((tramp == (unsigned long)mctx->mc_pad) && access_ok(tramp,
2*sizeof(unsigned long)))
flush_icache_range(tramp, tramp + 2 * sizeof(unsigned
long));
regs->link = tramp;
--
But it's up to you, it seems power-related.
Thanks,
Dmitry
