Hi Christophe,

> This patch converts emulate_spe() to using user_access_being
s/being/begin/ :)
> logic.
>
> Since commit 662bbcb2747c ("mm, sched: Allow uaccess in atomic with
> pagefault_disable()"), might_fault() doesn't fire when called from
> sections where pagefaults are disabled, which must be the case
> when using _inatomic variants of __get_user and __put_user. So
> the might_fault() in user_access_begin() is not a problem.
(likewise with the might_fault() in __get_user_nocheck, called from
unsafe_get_user())

> There was a verification of user_mode() together with the access_ok(),
> but the function returns in case !user_mode() immediately after
> the access_ok() verification, so removing that test has no effect.

I agree that removing the test is safe.

> -     /* Verify the address of the operand */
> -     if (unlikely(user_mode(regs) &&
> -                  !access_ok(addr, nb)))
> -             return -EFAULT;
> -

I found the reasoning a bit confusing: I think it's safe to remove
because:

 - we have the usermode check immediately following it:

>       /* userland only */
>       if (unlikely(!user_mode(regs)))
>               return 0;

 - and then we have the access_ok() check as part of
   user_read_access_begin later on in the function:

> +             if (!user_read_access_begin(addr, nb))
> +                     return -EFAULT;
> +


>               switch (nb) {
>               case 8:
> -                     ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[0], p++);
> -                     ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[1], p++);
> -                     ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[2], p++);
> -                     ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[3], p++);
> +                     unsafe_get_user(temp.v[0], p++, Efault_read);
> +                     unsafe_get_user(temp.v[1], p++, Efault_read);
> +                     unsafe_get_user(temp.v[2], p++, Efault_read);
> +                     unsafe_get_user(temp.v[3], p++, Efault_read);

This will bail early rather than trying every possible read. I think
that's OK. I can't think of a situation where we could fail to read the
first byte and then successfully read later bytes, for example. Also I
can't think of a sane way userspace could depend on that behaviour. So I
agree with this change (and the change to the write path).

>                       fallthrough;
>               case 4:
> -                     ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[4], p++);
> -                     ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[5], p++);
> +                     unsafe_get_user(temp.v[4], p++, Efault_read);
> +                     unsafe_get_user(temp.v[5], p++, Efault_read);
>                       fallthrough;
>               case 2:
> -                     ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[6], p++);
> -                     ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[7], p++);
> -                     if (unlikely(ret))
> -                             return -EFAULT;
> +                     unsafe_get_user(temp.v[6], p++, Efault_read);
> +                     unsafe_get_user(temp.v[7], p++, Efault_read);
>               }
> +             user_read_access_end();
>  
>               switch (instr) {
>               case EVLDD:
> @@ -255,31 +250,41 @@ static int emulate_spe(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned 
> int reg,
>  
>       /* Store result to memory or update registers */
>       if (flags & ST) {
> -             ret = 0;
>               p = addr;
> +
> +             if (!user_read_access_begin(addr, nb))

That should be a user_write_access_begin.

> +                     return -EFAULT;
> +


>  
>       return 1;
> +
> +Efault_read:

Checkpatch complains that this is CamelCase, which seems like a
checkpatch problem. Efault_{read,write} seem like good labels to me.

(You don't need to change anything, I just like to check the checkpatch
results when reviewing a patch.)

> +     user_read_access_end();
> +     return -EFAULT;
> +
> +Efault_write:
> +     user_write_access_end();
> +     return -EFAULT;
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SPE */
>

With the user_write_access_begin change:
  Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <d...@axtens.net>

Kind regards,
Daniel

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