Le 01/11/2018 à 04:54, Russell Currey a écrit :
On Wed, 2018-10-31 at 17:58 +0100, LEROY Christophe wrote:
Russell Currey <rus...@russell.cc> a écrit :
On Fri, 2018-10-26 at 18:29 +0200, LEROY Christophe wrote:
Russell Currey <rus...@russell.cc> a écrit :
Guarded Userspace Access Prevention is a security mechanism
that
prevents
the kernel from being able to read and write userspace
addresses
outside of
the allowed paths, most commonly copy_{to/from}_user().
At present, the only CPU that supports this is POWER9, and only
while using
the Radix MMU. Privileged reads and writes cannot access user
data
when
key 0 of the AMR is set. This is described in the "Radix Tree
Translation
Storage Protection" section of the POWER ISA as of version 3.0.
It is not right that only power9 can support that.
It's true that not only P9 can support it, but there are more
considerations under hash than radix, implementing this for radix
is a
first step.
I don't know much about hash, but I was talking about the 8xx which
is
a nohash ppc32. I'll see next week if I can do something with it on
top of your serie.
My small brain saw the number 8 and assumed you were talking about
POWER8, I didn't know what 8xx was until now.
Working on a refactor to make things a bit more generic, and removing
the radix name and dependency from the config option.
In signal_32.c and signal_64.c, save_user_regs() calls __put_user() to
modify code, then calls flush_icache_range() on user addresses.
Shouldn't flush_icache_range() be performed with userspace access
protection unlocked ?
Christophe
