On 30/08/2018 14:01, David Gibson wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 01:16:44PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>> The KVM TCE handlers are written in a way so they fail when either
>> something went horribly wrong or the userspace did some obvious mistake
>> such as passing a misaligned address.
>>
>> We are going to enhance the TCE checker to fail on attempts to map bigger
>> IOMMU page than the underlying pinned memory so let's valitate TCE
>> beforehand.
>>
>> This should cause no behavioral change.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <a...@ozlabs.ru>
>
> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <da...@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
>
> With one misgiving..
>
>> ---
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c | 8 ++++++++
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio_hv.c | 4 ++++
>> 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c
>> b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c
>> index 9a3f264..0fef22b 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c
>> @@ -599,6 +599,14 @@ long kvmppc_h_put_tce_indirect(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> ret = kvmppc_tce_validate(stt, tce);
>> if (ret != H_SUCCESS)
>> goto unlock_exit;
>> + }
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < npages; ++i) {
>> + if (get_user(tce, tces + i)) {
>
> This looks unsafe, because we validate, then regrab the TCE from
> userspace which could have been changed by another thread.
>
> But it actually is safe, because the relevant checks will be
> re-executed in the following code. If userspace tries to change this
> dodgily it will result in a messier failure mode but won't threaten
> the host.
I have put this to 3/4 for this get_user() while it should have been here:
+ /*
+ * This get_user() may produce a different result than few
+ * lines in the validation loop above but we translate it
+ * again little later anyway and if that fails, we simply stop
+ * and return error as it is likely the userspace shooting
+ * itself in a foot.
+ */
Might repost, testing that THP+realmode patch....
>
> Long term, I think we would be better off copying everything into
> kernel space then doing the validation just once. But the difference
> should only become apparent with a malicious or badly broken guest,
> and in the meantime this series addresses a real problem.
>
> So, I think we should go ahead with it despite that imperfection.
>
>
>> + ret = H_TOO_HARD;
>> + goto unlock_exit;
>> + }
>> + tce = be64_to_cpu(tce);
>>
>> if (kvmppc_gpa_to_ua(vcpu->kvm,
>> tce & ~(TCE_PCI_READ | TCE_PCI_WRITE),
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio_hv.c
>> b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio_hv.c
>> index 506a4d4..7ab6f3f 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio_hv.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio_hv.c
>> @@ -501,6 +501,10 @@ long kvmppc_rm_h_put_tce_indirect(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> ret = kvmppc_tce_validate(stt, tce);
>> if (ret != H_SUCCESS)
>> goto unlock_exit;
>> + }
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < npages; ++i) {
>> + unsigned long tce = be64_to_cpu(((u64 *)tces)[i]);
>>
>> ua = 0;
>> if (kvmppc_gpa_to_ua(vcpu->kvm,
>
--
Alexey
