I spotted this: +/** + * kdbus_proc_permission() - check /proc permissions on target pid + * @pid_ns: namespace we operate in + * @cred: credentials of requestor + * @target: target process + * + * This checks whether a process with credentials @cred can access information + * of @target in the namespace @pid_ns. This tries to follow /proc permissions, + * but is slightly more restrictive. + * + * Return: The /proc access level (KDBUS_META_PROC_*) is returned. + */ +static unsigned int kdbus_proc_permission(const struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, + const struct cred *cred, + struct pid *target)
That code ended up in a pull request, although AFAICT it was never in any patch email sent to me or to any public mailing list. I suspect it was at least partially a response to one of my old reviews. I haven't checked the context in which it's used, but in order for kdbus_proc_permission to do what it claims to do, it appears to be missing calls to security_inode_permission and security_file_permission. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
