On Mon, Jul 25, 2005 at 08:10:36PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > Andreas Steinmetz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > the attached patches are acked by Pavel and signed off by me > > OK, well I queued this up, without a changelog. Because you didn't send > one. Please do so. As it adds a new feature, quite a bit of info is > relevant.
I don't like this patch. It reinvents a fair amount of dm_crypt and cryptoloop but badly. Further, the model of security it's using is silly. In case anyone hasn't noticed, it stores the password on disk in the clear. This is so it can erase it after resume and thereby make recovery of the suspend image hard. But laptops get stolen while they're suspended, not while they're up and running. And if your box is up and running and an attacker gains access, the contents of your suspend partition are the least of your worries. It makes no sense to expend any effort defending against this case, especially as it's liable to become a barrier to doing this right, namely with real dm_crypt encrypted swap. At the very least, this should be renamed SWSUSP_QUICK_WIPE and any mention of encryption should be taken out of the description so users don't mistakenly think it provides any sort of useful protection. -- Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
