On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 16:17 +0000, David Howells wrote: > David Howells <[email protected]> wrote: > > > I can fix this in one of a number of ways: > > > > (1) Provide a generic control operation (analogous with ioctl()) that > > allows > > the user to make some general operation on a key (querying it, altering > > it, interacting with hardware). > > > > (2) Provide an alter operation that only allows the key to be altered. > > Looking at trusted_update(), though, I have a suspicion that this may > > not > > be sufficient as that also seems to invoke an interaction with the TPM. > > > > (3) Provide separate, specific keyctl functions for the special operations > > required by encrypted and trusted keys (and other key types > > potentially) > > that are then validated in the core and routed to the key type. > > (4) Simply make key_update() look for the encrypted and trusted key types > and call a special key type op for those. The main ->update op will be > taking preparsed data and would no longer be callable in this situation.
I prefer this last option. Define a separate 'update' option for trusted and encrypted keys, which would only create or modify, but never replace an existing key. thanks, Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
