* [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > btw., do you consider PaX as a 100% sure solution against 'code
> > injection' attacks (meaning that the attacker wants to execute an
> > arbitrary piece of code, and assuming the attacked application has a
> > stack overflow)? I.e. does PaX avoid all such attacks in a guaranteed
> > way?
>
> your question is answered in http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/pax.txt
> that i suggested you to read over a year ago. the short answer is that
> it's not only about stack overflows but any kind of memory corruption
> bugs, and you need both a properly configured kernel (for PaX/i386
> that would be SEGMEXEC/MPROTECT/NOELFRELOCS) and an access control
> system (to take care of the file system and file mappings) and a
> properly prepared userland (e.g., no text relocations in ELF
> executables/libs, which is a good thing anyway).
i'm just curious, assuming that all those conditions are true, do you
consider PaX a 100% sure solution against 'code injection' attacks?
(assuming that the above PaX and access-control feature implementations
are correct.) Do you think the upstream kernel could/should integrate it
as a solution against code injection attacks?
Ingo
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