On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 10:51:06PM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 01/26/2014 10:49 PM, Richard Weinberger wrote: > >> > >> No, because that information is available to user space unless we panic. > > > > Didn't you mean non-root? > > I thought one has to set dmesg_restrict anyways if kASLR is used. > > > > And isn't the offset available to perf too? > > Of course only for root, but still user space. > > > > For certain system security levels one want to protect even from a rogue > root. In those cases, leaking that information via dmesg and perf isn't > going to work, either. > > With lower security settings, by all means...
I am wondering if kdump functionality is impacted with this change. Kexec tools prepares ELF headers for kernel memory ranges and for the range where kernel text is mapped. So it needs to know virtual address of the region where kernel is mapped (obtained by /proc/kcore) and it gets the physical address where kernel is loaded from /proc/iomem. So with this change are we planning to hide kernel text virtual address and physical address information information from root in /proc/kcore and /proc/iomem in anyway? Thanks Vivek -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
