2013/10/19 Oleg Nesterov <o...@redhat.com>:
> On 10/17, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, 17 Oct 2013 22:44:56 -0300
>> "Geyslan G. Bem" <geys...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > and fix the possible 'dir'
>> > assignment after freeing it.
>
> This should be safe afaics, nobody will use it anyway. Even
> subsystem_release() won't be called if .open() fails. But I agree
> this doesn't look good.
Right.
>
>> I'm thinking of just nuking the tracing_open_generic() here. The only
>> thing it does here is the tracing_disabled check. The assignment of
>> inode->i_private to filp->private_data is pointless
>
> The same for ftrace_enable_fops() and ftrace_event_filter_fops() at
> least. The users of event_file_data() do not use ->private_data.
>
Aren't "ftrace_enable_fops" and "ftrace_event_filter_fops" structures?
About event_file_data() I think that the callers uses the
private_data. So, we have to analyze better.
> OTOH, say, trace_format_open() doesn't check tracing_disabled, so
>
>> We could add a tracing_is_disabled() function to test instead.
>
> perhaps it can have more callers.
>
static int trace_format_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *m;
int ret;
ret = seq_open(file, &trace_format_seq_ops);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
m = file->private_data;
m->private = file;
return 0;
}
I really got confused here. The 'm' assignments are, to me, pointless.
> Oleg.
>
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