On 09/12/2013 02:41 AM, Torsten Duwe wrote:
>
> Running completely virtualised, system Z severely lacks good true random
> sources.
> Gathering entropy in a virtual environment is difficult. To compensate, there
> is
> specialised crypto hardware which includes a source for hardware randomness;
> the zcrypt driver is able to access this random source. This patch adds a
> kernel
> thread that feeds the random bits via the interface created with the previous
> patch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Torsten Duwe <d...@lst.de>
>From what I can gather from the patch this is too heavyweight (need
locks and so on) to use as arch_get_random*(). There has been a lot of
discussion about the pros and cons of allowing the kernel to bypass
rngd, but I would think that any such plumbing -- once it gets past the
fully synchronous low latency properties of arch_get_random*() -- really
should be implemented as an option in the existing hwrng device
infrastructure.
In other words, start by implementing a hwrng device. That will work
right now with rngd running. Then we can consider if we want to allow
bypass of rngd for certain hwrng devices -- which may include zcrypt,
virtio_rng and so on.
-hpa
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