As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
permission in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebied...@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <rich...@nod.at>
---
security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe..9fccf71 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
*/
static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;
--
1.7.5.4
--
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