On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Julien Tinnes <j...@google.com> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:12 PM, H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com> wrote: >> On 04/04/2013 01:07 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> However, the benefits of >>> this feature in certain environments exceed the perceived weaknesses[2]. >> >> Could you clarify? > > I think privilege reduction in general, and sandboxing in particular, > can make KASLR even more useful. A lot of the information leaks can be > mitigated in the same way as attack surface and vulnerabilities can be > mitigated.
Case in point: - leaks of 64 bits kernel values to userland in compatibility sub-mode. Sandboxing by using seccomp-bpf can restrict a process to the 64-bit mode API. - restricting access to the syslog() system call Julien -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
