On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 10:30:45AM -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: > On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 04:57:47AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > [..] > > > - encourage things like per-host random keys - with the stupid UEFI > > > checks disabled entirely if required. They are almost certainly going > > > to be *more* secure than depending on some crazy root of trust based > > > on a big company, with key signing authorities that trust anybody with > > > a credit card. Try to teach people about things like that instead. > > > Encourage people to do their own (random) keys, and adding those to > > > their UEFI setups (or not: the whole UEFI thing is more about control > > > than security), and strive to do things like one-time signing with the > > > private key thrown out entirely. IOW try to encourage *that* kind of > > > "we made sure to ask the user very explicitly with big warnings and > > > create his own key for that particular module" security. Real > > > security, not "we control the user" security. > > > > Yes, ideally people will engage in self-signing and distributions will > > have mechanisms for dealing with that. > > So even if a user installs its own keys in UEFI to boot self signed > shim, kernel and modules, I am assuming that we will still need to > make sure kexec does not load and run an unsigned kernel? (Otherwise > there is no point in installing user keys in UEFI and there is an > easy way to bypass it).
As I am kind of lost in the long mail thread, so I will ask. If a user installs its own keys in UEFI database and boots self signed linux kernel, will we still make sure that no unsigned code can be run at ring 0 (without explicitly asking user on console). Thanks Vivek -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
