Thanks!
Acked-by: Will Drewry <w...@chromium.org>
On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:15 PM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote:
> The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1
> could only kill a process. While we still want to make sure an audit
> record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since
> seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors. In the case of "handled"
> behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a record if the process is
> under inspection. This change also fixes userspace examination of seccomp
> audit events, since it was considered malformed due to missing fields of
> the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type.
>
> Cc: Julien Tinnes <j...@google.com>
> Cc: Will Drewry <w...@google.com>
> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgr...@redhat.com>
> ---
> v2:
> - update commit message and add Cc to stable, suggested by Steve Grubb
>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 3 ++-
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/auditsc.c | 14 +++++++++++---
> 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index bce729a..9d5104d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr);
>
> static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
> {
> - if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> + /* Force a record to be reported if a signal was delivered. */
> + if (signr || unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code);
> }
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 76352ac..09a2d94 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MMAP 1323 /* Record showing descriptor and
> flags in mmap */
> #define AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT 1324 /* Packets traversing netfilter
> chains */
> #define AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG 1325 /* Netfilter chain modifications */
> +#define AUDIT_SECCOMP 1326 /* Secure Computing event */
>
> #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
> #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 2f186ed..157e989 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -2735,7 +2735,7 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
> context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
> }
>
> -static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long
> signr)
> +static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> kuid_t auid, uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> @@ -2753,6 +2753,11 @@ static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> char *reason, long signr)
> audit_log_task_context(ab);
> audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
> +}
> +
> +static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long
> signr)
> +{
> + audit_log_task(ab);
> audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
> audit_log_string(ab, reason);
> audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
> @@ -2783,8 +2788,11 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long
> signr, int code)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
>
> - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
> - audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
> + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
> + if (unlikely(!ab))
> + return;
> + audit_log_task(ab);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
> audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
> audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
> audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
> --
> 1.7.9.5
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
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