Hi, On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 2:48 PM, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheu...@gmail.com> wrote: >> This seems like a good idea to me. It would allow more than just the >> loader to harden userspace allocations. It's a more direct version of >> PaX's "MPROTECT" feature[1]. That feature hardens existing loaders, >> but doesn't play nice with JITs (like Java), but this lets a loader >> (or JIT) opt-in to the protection and have some direct control over it. > > If desired, additional restrictions can be imposed by using the > security framework, e.g,, disallow non-final r-x mappings.
Interesting; what kind of interface did you have in mind? >> It seems like there needs to be a sensible way to detect that this flag is >> available, though. > > I am open for suggestions to address this. Our particular > implementation of the loader (on an embedded system) tries to set it > on the first mmap invocation, and stops trying if it fails. Not the > most elegant approach, I know ... Actually, that seems easiest. Has there been any more progress on this patch over-all? -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
