update: latest x86.git#mm has a pretty much working stack-protector feature - you can pick it up for testing via:
http://people.redhat.com/mingo/x86.git/README as [EMAIL PROTECTED] has indicated it already in his analysis and patch, there were multiple bugs hitting us here. The amount and scope of these problems show structural problems in how security in this area was approached. So with these changes we try to go deeper than just minimally fixing the feature. We've got 15 changes so far in and around this area: x86: fix execve with -fstack-protect x86: exclude vsyscall files from stackprotect x86: fix stackprotect Makefile rule x86: fix stackprotector canary updates during context switches panic: print more informative messages on stackprotect failure panic: print out stacktrace if DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE x86: enable stack-protector by default x86: setup stack canary for the idle threads x86: fix canary of the boot CPU's idle task stackprotector: include files stackprotector: add boot_init_stack_canary() x86: fix the stackprotector canary of the boot CPU x86: stackprotector: mix TSC to the boot canary x86: test the presence of the stackprotector x86: streamline stackprotector but we've not completed this work yet. We'll push the independent bits to Linus ASAP. Ingo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
