The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash, policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
Define struct trusted_key_tpm and move the TPM-specific fields there. Store a pointer to it in the private member of struct trusted_key_options. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> --- Changelog: v5: - Rename struct trusted_tpm_options to struct trusted_key_tpm, as suggested by Jarkko. v4: - Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were merged - Resolved the resulting merge conflicts v3: - Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature") v2: - Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7 - Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private - Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean up patch) - Address other minor comments from Jarkko include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 --- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++--------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { struct trusted_key_options { uint16_t keytype; - uint32_t keyhandle; - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t blobauth_len; - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t pcrinfo_len; - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; - int pcrlock; - uint32_t hash; - uint32_t policydigest_len; - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t policyhandle; void *private; }; diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 3a0fa3bc8454..dafbd4a84ddd 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -6,6 +6,20 @@ extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; +struct trusted_key_tpm { + uint32_t keyhandle; + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t blobauth_len; + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; + int pcrlock; + uint32_t hash; + uint32_t policydigest_len; + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t policyhandle; +}; + int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index bf0bf7f36970..d396f4267180 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum { #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private; + if (!trusted_debug) return; pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); - pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); - pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); - pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle); + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock); + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len); print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); + 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0); } static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) @@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private; int ret; struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; - ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo, + private->pcrinfo_len); if (ret < 0) pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); @@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private; int ret; struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE); - ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); + ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob, + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); if (ret < 0) pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); else @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, struct trusted_key_options *opt) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private; substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; char *p = c; int token; @@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2; - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; if (!c) return 0; @@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, switch (token) { case Opt_pcrinfo: - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) + private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; + if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, - opt->pcrinfo_len); + res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from, + private->pcrinfo_len); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; break; @@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; - opt->keyhandle = handle; + private->keyhandle = handle; break; case Opt_keyauth: if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, + res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) */ - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); + private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; + private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; break; } - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - opt->blobauth_len); + if (tpm2 && + private->blobauth_len <= + sizeof(private->blobauth)) { + memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from, + private->blobauth_len); break; } @@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; - opt->pcrlock = lock; + private->pcrlock = lock; break; case Opt_hash: if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) return -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { - opt->hash = i; + private->hash = i; break; } } @@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, } break; case Opt_policydigest: - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash]; if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, + res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from, digest_len); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; + private->policydigest_len = digest_len; break; case Opt_policyhandle: if (!tpm2) @@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; - opt->policyhandle = handle; + private->policyhandle = handle; break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private; struct trusted_key_options *options; int tpm2; @@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) /* set any non-zero defaults */ options->keytype = SRK_keytype; - if (!tpm2) - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + private = kzalloc_obj(*private); + if (!private) { + kfree_sensitive(options); + options = NULL; + } else { + if (!tpm2) + private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + options->private = private; + } } return options; } static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; int ret = 0; int tpm2; @@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; dump_options(options); - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { + private = options->private; + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; } - if (options->pcrlock) { - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); + if (private->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } } out: + if (options) + kfree_sensitive(options->private); kfree_sensitive(options); return ret; } static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; int ret = 0; int tpm2; @@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; dump_options(options); - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { + private = options->private; + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) if (ret < 0) pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - if (options->pcrlock) { - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); + if (private->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } } out: + if (options) + kfree_sensitive(options->private); kfree_sensitive(options); return ret; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 67225dd562a9..29da1a3328ef 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 *src, u32 len) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); u8 *work = scratch, *work1; @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { + if (private->blobauth_len == 0) { unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, goto err; } - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle); work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 **buf) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; int ret; struct tpm2_key_context ctx; u8 *blob; @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return -ENOMEM; *buf = blob; - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent; memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); blob += ctx.priv_len; @@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL; @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 flags; int rc; - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash); if (hash < 0) return hash; - if (!options->keyhandle) + if (!private->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); @@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE); - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); if (rc) goto out; tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len); - if (options->blobauth_len) - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); + if (private->blobauth_len) + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len); @@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* key properties */ flags = 0; - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; + flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT); tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags); /* policy */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len); - if (options->policydigest_len) - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len); + if (private->policydigest_len) + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest, + private->policydigest_len); /* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL); @@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *blob_handle) { u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ - if (!options->keyhandle) + if (!private->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE); tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); if (rc) return rc; - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth, + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len); @@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options, u32 blob_handle) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; struct tpm_header *head; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; u16 data_len; @@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (rc) return rc; - if (!options->policyhandle) { + if (!private->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, - options->blobauth, - options->blobauth_len); + private->blobauth, + private->blobauth_len); } else { /* * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated * password. */ - tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle, + tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle, NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); + private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len); if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); -- 2.53.0
