nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() matches each requested listener against the
existing set. The nested loop that does this is O(N * M), where N is the
requested count and M is the existing count. The loop runs under sv_lock
with bottom halves disabled. A userland request with a very large listener
list can therefore spin in atomic context for a long time.

Reject a request that carries more than NFSD_NL_LISTENER_MAX (1024)
entries. The check goes in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(), before the code
takes any lock. The limit is far above any realistic configuration.

This patch does not cap M. Only the message size bounded N; real sockets
bound M. A listener_set result set is the requested set, so that path also
holds M at the cap, but __write_ports_addxprt() adds two listeners per call
and removes none, so repeated calls can push M past it. The worst case
under sv_lock is therefore 1024 * M, plus 1024 nla_parse_nested() calls.
Both interfaces require CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Fixes: 16a471177496 ("NFSD: add listener-{set,get} netlink command")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
index 5331b89c4281..b6f4d66f612a 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
@@ -1995,21 +1995,22 @@ int nfsd_nl_version_get_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, 
struct genl_info *info)
        return err;
 }
 
+/* Upper bound on the number of listeners a single request may carry. */
+#define NFSD_NL_LISTENER_MAX   1024
+
 /**
  * nfsd_nl_validate_listeners - sanity-check the listener list from userland
  * @info: netlink metadata and command arguments
  *
- * Walk every NFSD_A_SERVER_SOCK_ADDR attribute and confirm that each entry
- * is well-formed: it parses against the policy, carries both an address and
- * a transport name, and the address is long enough for its family. Doing
- * this up front lets the callers below assume every entry is valid and
- * guarantees we make no changes when the request is malformed.
+ * Walk every NFSD_A_SERVER_SOCK_ADDR attribute and confirm that the list is
+ * not oversized and that each entry is well-formed.
  *
  * Return: 0 if every entry is valid, or a negative errno otherwise.
  */
 static int nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(struct genl_info *info)
 {
        const struct nlattr *attr;
+       unsigned int count = 0;
        int rem;
 
        nlmsg_for_each_attr_type(attr, NFSD_A_SERVER_SOCK_ADDR, info->nlhdr,
@@ -2018,6 +2019,11 @@ static int nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(struct genl_info 
*info)
                struct sockaddr *sa;
                int err;
 
+               if (++count > NFSD_NL_LISTENER_MAX) {
+                       NL_SET_ERR_MSG(info->extack, "too many listeners");
+                       return -E2BIG;
+               }
+
                err = nla_parse_nested(tb, NFSD_A_SOCK_MAX, attr,
                                       nfsd_sock_nl_policy, info->extack);
                if (err < 0)

-- 
2.55.0


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