Nothing in this file splices a socket whose last decrypt failed, so the check that fails tls_sw_splice_read() on a broken connection can be removed without a test noticing. Such a splice hands the application plaintext that recvmsg() and read_sock() already refuse to return.
Extend the bad_auth pattern. Corrupt an authenticated record, confirm recvmsg() reports EBADMSG, then splice the same socket and require EBADMSG again. A synchronous decrypt fails again on the still-queued record, so only an async decrypt reaches EBADMSG through the recorded-failure check alone. bad_auth builds the same corrupted record, so its construction moves into a helper the two tests share. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]> --- tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c index a0e72e402748..9d3cd4fff062 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "kselftest_harness.h" #define TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN 16384 +#define TLS_HDR_LEN 5 #define SOL_TLS 282 static int fips_enabled; @@ -2732,28 +2733,83 @@ TEST_F(tls_err, bad_rec) EXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); } +/* cfd carries a byte stream, so one recv() can return part of a + * record. Take the fragment length from the record header and wait + * for the remainder. + */ +static void tls_send_bad_auth(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, + int fd, int cfd, int fd2) +{ + char buf[128]; + int len; + + memrnd(buf, sizeof(buf) / 2); + ASSERT_EQ(send(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) / 2, 0), sizeof(buf) / 2); + + ASSERT_EQ(recv(cfd, buf, TLS_HDR_LEN, MSG_WAITALL), TLS_HDR_LEN); + + len = ((unsigned char)buf[3] << 8) | (unsigned char)buf[4]; + ASSERT_GT(len, 0); + ASSERT_LE(len, (int)sizeof(buf) - TLS_HDR_LEN); + + ASSERT_EQ(recv(cfd, buf + TLS_HDR_LEN, len, MSG_WAITALL), len); + + buf[TLS_HDR_LEN + len - 1]++; + + ASSERT_EQ(send(fd2, buf, TLS_HDR_LEN + len, 0), TLS_HDR_LEN + len); +} + TEST_F(tls_err, bad_auth) { char buf[128]; - int n; if (self->notls) SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); - memrnd(buf, sizeof(buf) / 2); - EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, buf, sizeof(buf) / 2, 0), sizeof(buf) / 2); - n = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); - EXPECT_GT(n, sizeof(buf) / 2); + tls_send_bad_auth(_metadata, self->fd, self->cfd, self->fd2); - buf[n - 1]++; - - EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd2, buf, n, 0), n); EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd2, buf, sizeof(buf), 0), -1); EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBADMSG); EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd2, buf, sizeof(buf), 0), -1); EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBADMSG); } +/* A record that did not authenticate breaks the connection for every + * reader, splice included. + * + * The two decrypt paths reach that result differently. A synchronous + * decrypt leaves the record parsed, so the splice re-runs the decrypt + * and fails on the record itself; the ctx->async_wait.err check in + * tls_sw_splice_read() is not what stops it. Only an asynchronous + * decrypt, which needs a TLS 1.2 socket and an AEAD advertising + * CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, consumes the record before the failure is + * recorded, leaving that check the sole reason the splice fails. + */ +TEST_F(tls_err, bad_auth_splice) +{ + char buf[128]; + ssize_t ret; + int p[2]; + + if (self->notls) + SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); + + tls_send_bad_auth(_metadata, self->fd, self->cfd, self->fd2); + + EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd2, buf, sizeof(buf), 0), -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBADMSG); + + ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); + + ret = splice(self->cfd2, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf), + SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK); + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBADMSG); + + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); +} + TEST_F(tls_err, bad_in_large_read) { char txt[3][64]; @@ -3009,7 +3065,6 @@ static size_t parse_tls_records(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, { const __u8 *rec = rx_buf; size_t total_plaintext_rx = 0; - const __u8 rec_header_len = 5; while (rec < rx_buf + rx_len) { __u16 record_payload_len; @@ -3029,7 +3084,7 @@ static size_t parse_tls_records(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, /* Plaintext must not exceed the specified limit */ ASSERT_LE(plaintext_len, max_payload_len); - rec += rec_header_len + record_payload_len; + rec += TLS_HDR_LEN + record_payload_len; } return total_plaintext_rx; -- 2.54.0
