On Sun, Feb 10, 2008 at 04:40:53AM -0500, Niki Denev wrote:
> this fixed the problem for me (kernel 2.6.24.1) :
> It appears that the initial patch checked the input to vmsplice_to_user,
> but the exploit used vmsplice_to_pipe which remained open to the attack.
This patch is broken. It opens the old hole again.
> @@ -1450,6 +1454,31 @@
> .ops = &user_page_pipe_buf_ops,
> };
>
> + error = ret = 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * Get user address base and length for this iovec.
> + */
> + error = get_user(base, &iov->iov_base);
> + if (unlikely(error))
> + return error;
> + error = get_user(len, &iov->iov_len);
> + if (unlikely(error))
> + return error;
iov is unchecked.
> + if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, base, len))) {
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
Use VERIFY_READ and this only checks the first entry.
I checked the following patch and it at least fixes the known exploit.
diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c
index 14e2262..80beb2b 100644
--- a/fs/splice.c
+++ b/fs/splice.c
@@ -1237,6 +1237,11 @@ static int get_iovec_page_array(const struct iovec
__user *iov,
if (unlikely(!base))
break;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, base, len)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+
/*
* Get this base offset and number of pages, then map
* in the user pages.
--
Even historians fail to learn from history -- they repeat the same mistakes.
-- John Gill, "Patterns of Force", stardate 2534.7
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