Adds a basic selftest exercising a usermode IBT violation.

Signed-off-by: Richard Patel <[email protected]>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile   |   5 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/user_ibt.c | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 251 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/user_ibt.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile 
b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
index 434065215d12..59f2ba3ec4ea 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ CAN_BUILD_WITH_NOPIE := $(shell ./check_cc.sh "$(CC)" 
trivial_program.c -no-pie)
 TARGETS_C_BOTHBITS := single_step_syscall sysret_ss_attrs syscall_nt 
test_mremap_vdso \
                        check_initial_reg_state sigreturn iopl ioperm \
                        test_vsyscall mov_ss_trap sigtrap_loop \
-                       syscall_arg_fault fsgsbase_restore sigaltstack
+                       syscall_arg_fault fsgsbase_restore sigaltstack user_ibt
 TARGETS_C_BOTHBITS += nx_stack
 TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \
                        test_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \
@@ -138,3 +138,6 @@ $(OUTPUT)/avx_64: CFLAGS += -mno-avx -mno-avx512f
 $(OUTPUT)/amx_64: EXTRA_FILES += xstate.c
 $(OUTPUT)/avx_64: EXTRA_FILES += xstate.c
 $(OUTPUT)/apx_64: EXTRA_FILES += xstate.c
+
+$(OUTPUT)/user_ibt_32: CFLAGS += -fcf-protection=branch
+$(OUTPUT)/user_ibt_64: CFLAGS += -fcf-protection=branch
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/user_ibt.c 
b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/user_ibt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b1038e5e5e64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/user_ibt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test kernel support for userspace Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT).
+ * Enables IBT manually via prctl(). Must be compiled with
+ * -fcf-protection=branch to enable ENDBR64 instrumentation.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/signal.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <linux/const.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <ucontext.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+
+/*
+ * Allow building this test with old kernel headers.
+ */
+#ifndef PR_SET_CFI
+#define PR_GET_CFI                     80
+#define PR_SET_CFI                     81
+#endif
+#ifndef PR_CFI_ENABLE
+#define PR_CFI_ENABLE                  (1UL << 0)
+#define PR_CFI_DISABLE                 (1UL << 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS
+#define PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS     0
+#endif
+#ifndef SEGV_CPERR
+#define SEGV_CPERR                     10
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(__CET__) || (__CET__ & 1) != 1
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+       ksft_print_header();
+       ksft_exit_skip("Compiler does not support CET.\n");
+       return 0;
+}
+#else
+void __attribute__((naked, aligned(4096))) valid_target(void)
+{
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+       asm volatile("endbr64\n");
+#else
+       asm volatile("endbr32\n");
+#endif
+       asm volatile(
+               "ret\n"
+               ".p2align 12\n"
+       );
+}
+
+void __attribute__((nocf_check, naked, aligned(4096))) invalid_target(void)
+{
+       asm volatile(
+               "ret\n"
+               ".p2align 12\n"
+       );
+}
+
+void __attribute__((naked)) user_ibt_basic_test(void)
+{
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+       asm volatile(
+               "leaq valid_target(%rip), %rax\n"
+               "call *%rax\n"
+               "ret\n"
+       );
+#else
+       asm volatile(
+               "movl $valid_target, %eax\n"
+               "call *%eax\n"
+               "ret\n"
+       );
+#endif
+}
+
+void __attribute__((naked)) user_ibt_notrack_test(void)
+{
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+       asm volatile (
+               "leaq invalid_target(%rip), %rax\n"
+               "notrack call *%rax\n"
+               "ret\n"
+       );
+#else
+       asm volatile (
+               "movl $invalid_target, %eax\n"
+               "notrack call *%eax\n"
+               "ret\n"
+       );
+#endif
+}
+
+static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t num_segv;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t got_cperr;
+
+static void segv_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *uc)
+{
+       num_segv++;
+       got_cperr = si->si_code == SEGV_CPERR;
+       siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
+}
+
+int user_ibt_violation_test(void)
+{
+       struct sigaction sa = {};
+       size_t volatile ptr;
+
+       num_segv = 0;
+       got_cperr = false;
+
+       sa.sa_sigaction = segv_handler;
+       sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+       if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL))
+               return 0;
+
+       if (!sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1)) {
+               /*
+                * Force an indirect call and drop 'nocf_check' attribute.
+                * Obfuscate cast through a temp local to suppress
+                * -Wincompatible-pointer-types (which correctly detects
+                * the nocf_check attribute mismatch)
+                */
+               ptr = (size_t)invalid_target;
+               ((void (* volatile)(void))ptr)();
+               /* Fall through in case this didn't SIGSEGV */
+       }
+
+       signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+
+       return num_segv == 1 && got_cperr;
+}
+
+static int user_ibt_signal_handler(void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t *, void *), 
bool expect_segv)
+{
+       struct sigaction sa = {};
+       pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+       if (pid < 0)
+               return 0;
+       num_segv = 0;
+       got_cperr = false;
+
+       sa.sa_sigaction = handler;
+       sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+       if (sigaction(SIGPWR, &sa, NULL))
+               return 0;
+
+       sa.sa_sigaction = segv_handler;
+       sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+       if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL))
+               return 0;
+
+       if (kill(getpid(), SIGPWR))
+               return 0;
+
+       signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+       signal(SIGPWR, SIG_DFL);
+
+       return 1;
+}
+
+int user_ibt_signal_handler_valid(void)
+{
+       user_ibt_signal_handler((void *)valid_target, false);
+       return num_segv == 0;
+}
+
+bool has_endbr_preamble(void *ptr)
+{
+       const unsigned char *p = ptr;
+
+       if (!(p[0] == 0xf3 && p[1] == 0x0f && p[2] == 0x1e))
+               return false;
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+       return p[3] == 0xfa;
+#else
+       return p[3] == 0xfb;
+#endif
+}
+
+int user_ibt_vdso(void)
+{
+       struct sigaction sa = {};
+       struct timespec ts;
+       int ret = 1;
+
+       sa.sa_sigaction = segv_handler;
+       sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+       if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL))
+               return 0;
+
+       if (!sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1))
+               (void)clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+       else
+               ret = 0;
+
+       signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+       unsigned long lpad_status = PR_CFI_ENABLE;
+
+       ksft_print_header();
+
+       if (!has_endbr_preamble((void *)printf))
+               ksft_exit_skip("libc does not support IBT (needs 
-fcf-protection=branch)\n");
+
+       if (syscall(__NR_prctl, PR_SET_CFI, PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS, 
lpad_status, 0, 0)) {
+               if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EOPNOTSUPP)
+                       ksft_exit_skip("User IBT is not supported.\n");
+               ksft_exit_fail_perror("Failed to enable user IBT");
+       }
+
+       ksft_set_plan(5);
+
+       user_ibt_basic_test();
+       ksft_test_result_pass("valid indirect call with endbr64\n");
+
+       user_ibt_notrack_test();
+       ksft_test_result_pass("notrack indirect call to non-endbr target\n");
+
+       ksft_test_result(user_ibt_violation_test(),
+                        "indirect call to non-endbr target raises SIGSEGV\n");
+
+       ksft_test_result(user_ibt_signal_handler_valid(),
+                        "Signal handler sanity check\n");
+
+       ksft_test_result(user_ibt_vdso(), "vDSO supports IBT\n");
+
+       ksft_finished();
+}
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
-- 
2.47.3


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