Fan Wu <wu...@kernel.org> writes:
> On Sat, Jul 19, 2025 at 4:13 AM Abhinav Saxena <xandf...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Add is_memfd_file() function to reliably detect memfd files by checking
>> for “memfd:” prefix in dentry names on shmem-backed files. This
>> distinguishes true memfd files from regular shmem files.
>>
>> Move domain_is_scoped() to domain.c for reuse across subsystems.
>> Add comprehensive kunit tests for memfd detection edge cases.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Abhinav Saxena <xandf...@gmail.com>
>> —
>> security/landlock/domain.c | 67 +++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/domain.h | 4 +
>> security/landlock/fs.c | 210
>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/task.c | 67 —————
>> 4 files changed, 281 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
>
> …
>
>>
>> +/**
>> + * is_memfd_file - Check if file was created via memfd_create()
>> + * @file: File to check
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if @file was created via memfd_create(), false otherwise.
>> + *
>> + * memfd files are shmem-backed files with “memfd:” prefix in their dentry
>> name.
>> + * This is the definitive way to distinguish memfd files from regular shmem
>> + * files.
>> + */
>> +static bool is_memfd_file(struct file *file)
>> +{
>> + const struct dentry *dentry;
>> + const unsigned char *name;
>> + size_t name_len;
>> +
>> + /* Fast path: basic validation */
>> + if (unlikely(!file))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + /* Must be shmem-backed first - this is the cheapest definitive
>> check */
>> + if (!shmem_file(file))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE
>> +
>> + /* Validate dentry and get name info */
>> + dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
>> + if (unlikely(!dentry))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + name_len = dentry->d_name.len;
>> + name = dentry->d_name.name;
>> +
>> + /* memfd files always have “memfd:” prefix (6 characters) */
>> + if (name_len < 6 || unlikely(!name))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + /* Check for exact “memfd:” prefix */
>> + return memcmp(name, “memfd:”, 6) == 0;
>> +#else
>> + return false;
>> +#endif
>
> I was trying to do something similar early this year but didn’t hear
> feedback from the linux-mm folks.
> <https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20250129203932.22165-1-wu...@kernel.org/>
>
> I have considered this approach but didn’t use it. My concern is,
> potentially a malicious user can create a file in a shmem fs, e.g.
> tmpfs , with the “memfd:” prefix, which can be used to bypass security
> policy.
> (Resending this message due to a misconfiguration with my email
> client. Apologies for any inconvenience.)
>
> -Fan
Hi Fan,
Thanks for your comments.
I agree that an LSM hook into memfd_create() would be a much better
solution. In the absence of such a function, do you think adding a
`d_unlinked(dentry)` check could serve as an additional verification?
I say things since I *think* that legitimate memfd files are always
unlinked while spoofed tmpfs files remain linked. I could be wrong
though.
In any case, we can test this approach using kprobes to validate
the behavior.
-Abhinav
