If files with portable signatures are copied from one location to another
or are extracted from an archive, verification can temporarily fail until
all xattrs/attrs are set in the destination. Only portable signatures may
be moved or copied from one file to another, as they don't depend on
system-specific information such as the inode generation. Instead portable
signatures must include security.ima.

Unlike other security.evm types, EVM portable signatures are also
immutable. Thus, it wouldn't be a problem to allow xattr/attr operations
when verification fails, as portable signatures will never be replaced with
the HMAC on possibly corrupted xattrs/attrs.

This patch first introduces a new integrity status called
INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, that allows callers of
evm_verify_current_integrity() to detect that a portable signature didn't
pass verification and then adds an exception in evm_protect_xattr() and
evm_inode_setattr() for this status and returns 0 instead of -EPERM.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sa...@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/integrity.h             |  1 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 2271939c5c31..2ea0f2f65ab6 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum integrity_status {
        INTEGRITY_PASS = 0,
        INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE,
        INTEGRITY_FAIL,
+       INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE,
        INTEGRITY_NOLABEL,
        INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS,
        INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN,
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c 
b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 6556e8c22da9..eab536fa260f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
 int evm_initialized;
 
 static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
-       "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+       "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label",
+       "no_xattrs", "unknown"
 };
 int evm_hmac_attrs;
 
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry 
*dentry,
        enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
        struct evm_digest digest;
        struct inode *inode;
-       int rc, xattr_len;
+       int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
 
        if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
                     iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
@@ -200,8 +201,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry 
*dentry,
                if (rc)
                        rc = -EINVAL;
                break;
-       case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
        case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+               evm_immutable = 1;
+               fallthrough;
+       case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
                /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */
                if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) {
                        evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
@@ -238,9 +241,12 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry 
*dentry,
                break;
        }
 
-       if (rc)
-               evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
-                               INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+       if (rc) {
+               evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS;
+               if (rc != -ENODATA)
+                       evm_status = evm_immutable ?
+                                    INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+       }
 out:
        if (iint)
                iint->evm_status = evm_status;
@@ -374,6 +380,14 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const 
char *xattr_name,
 out:
        if (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status))
                return 0;
+
+       /*
+        * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
+        * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
+        */
+       if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
+               return 0;
+
        if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
                integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, 
d_backing_inode(dentry),
                                    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
@@ -534,8 +548,13 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr 
*attr)
        if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
                return 0;
        evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+       /*
+        * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures
+        * are immutable and can never be updated.
+        */
        if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
            (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
+           (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) ||
            (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status)))
                return 0;
        integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c 
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index d4b8db1acadd..24d59893aab0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -416,6 +416,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
        case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL:         /* No security.evm xattr. */
                cause = "missing-HMAC";
                goto out;
+       case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE:
+               fallthrough;
        case INTEGRITY_FAIL:            /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */
                cause = "invalid-HMAC";
                goto out;
-- 
2.26.2

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