On Wed, Dec 02, 2020 at 08:49:06PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote: > On 1.12.2020 23.45, Topi Miettinen wrote: > > Memory mappings inside kernel allocated with vmalloc() are in > > predictable order and packed tightly toward the low addresses. With > > new kernel boot parameter 'randomize_vmalloc=1', the entire area is > > used randomly to make the allocations less predictable and harder to > > guess for attackers. > > > > This also seems to randomize module addresses. I was going to check that > next, so nice surprise!
Heh, that's because module_alloc() uses vmalloc() in that way or another :) > -Topi > > > spin_unlock(&free_vmap_area_lock); > > if (unlikely(addr == vend)) > > > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.
