ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat() checks whether each
auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key is nonzero and if so puts that
key. However, in some early mount error paths nothing has initialized
the pointer, and we try to key_put() garbage. Running the bad cipher
tests in the testsuite exposes this, and it's happy with the following
change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Index: linux/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ linux/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -1851,7 +1851,7 @@ ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecry
struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;
int rc = 0;
- new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache,
+ new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_auth_tok) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
--
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