-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
KaiGai Kohei wrote:
>> There is already a pam_cap module in the libcap2 package. Can we merge
>> this functionality?
>
> I think it is a good idea.
>
> However, this module already have a feature to modify inheritable
> capability set.
> How does it to be described in the "/etc/security/capability.conf"?
>
> One idea is like a following convention:
>
> # compatible configuration. We can omit "i:" at the head of line
> cap_setfcap tak
> # It drops any capabilities from b-set except for cap_net_raw and
> cap_fowner
> b:cap_net_raw,cap_fowner ymj
> # It drops only cap_dac_override from b-set.
> b:-cap_dac_override kaigai
> # It drops only cap_sys_admin from b-set of any user within users group.
> b:-cap_sys_admin group:users
I like the idea of a separate line for bounds.
For ease of parsing, perhaps '!' or some other symbol prefix to the line
could be used to identify lines that refer to cap_bound?
In other modules, @groupname is used to capture a group association.
Lines like this should be supported:
!cap_net_raw @regularusers # suppress from cap_bset
cap_net_raw @pingers morgan # add to pI
where morgan is not in group @pingers but is in group @regularusers.
Cheers
Andrew
>
> Thanks,
>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Andrew
>>
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Quoting KaiGai Kohei ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
>>>> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>> The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities
>>>>> cannot grow. Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be
>>>>> manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities.
>>>>> Root can remove capabilities. By default it includes all caps
>>>>> except CAP_SETPCAP.
>>>> Serge,
>>>>
>>>> This feature makes me being interested in.
>>>> I think you intend to apply this feature for the primary process
>>>> of security container.
>>>> However, it is also worthwhile to apply when a session is starting up.
>>>>
>>>> The following PAM module enables to drop capability bounding bit
>>>> specified by the fifth field in /etc/passwd entry.
>>>> This code is just an example now, but considerable feature.
>>>>
>>>> build and install:
>>>> # gcc -Wall -c pam_cap_drop.c
>>>> # gcc -Wall -shared -Xlinker -x -o pam_cap_drop.so pam_cap_drop.o -lpam
>>>> # cp pam_cap_drop.so /lib/security
>>>>
>>>> modify /etc/passwd as follows:
>>>>
>>>> tak:x:1004:100:cap_drop=cap_net_raw,cap_chown:/home/tak:/bin/bash
>>>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>>> example:
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ ping 192.168.1.1
>>>> PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
>>>> 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.23 ms
>>>> 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=1.02 ms
>>>>
>>>> --- 192.168.1.1 ping statistics ---
>>>> 2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 999ms
>>>> rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 1.023/1.130/1.237/0.107 ms
>>>>
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ ssh [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED]'s password:
>>>> Last login: Sat Dec 1 10:09:29 2007 from masu.myhome.cx
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ export LANG=C
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ ping 192.168.1.1
>>>> ping: icmp open socket: Operation not permitted
>>>>
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ su
>>>> Password:
>>>> pam_cap_bset[6921]: user root does not have 'cap_drop=' property
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] tak]# cat /proc/self/status | grep ^Cap
>>>> CapInh: 0000000000000000
>>>> CapPrm: 00000000ffffdffe
>>>> CapEff: 00000000ffffdffe
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] tak]#
>>> Neat. A bigger-stick version of not adding the account to
>>> group wheel. I'll use that.
>>>
>>> Is there any reason not to have a separate /etc/login.capbounds
>>> config file, though, so the account can still have a full name?
>>> Did you only use that for convenience of proof of concept, or
>>> is there another reason?
>>>
>>>> # BTW, I replaced the James's address in the Cc: list,
>>>> # because MTA does not accept it.
>>> Thanks! I don't know what happened to my alias for him...
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> -serge
>>>
>>>> --
>>>> KaiGai Kohei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>>>
>>>> ************************************************************
>>>> pam_cap_drop.c
>>>> ************************************************************
>>>>
>>>> /*
>>>> * pam_cap_drop.c module -- drop capabilities bounding set
>>>> *
>>>> * Copyright: 2007 KaiGai Kohei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>>> */
>>>>
>>>> #include <errno.h>
>>>> #include <pwd.h>
>>>> #include <stdlib.h>
>>>> #include <stdio.h>
>>>> #include <string.h>
>>>> #include <syslog.h>
>>>> #include <sys/prctl.h>
>>>> #include <sys/types.h>
>>>>
>>>> #include <security/pam_modules.h>
>>>>
>>>> #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
>>>> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
>>>> #endif
>>>>
>>>> static char *captable[] = {
>>>> "cap_chown",
>>>> "cap_dac_override",
>>>> "cap_dac_read_search",
>>>> "cap_fowner",
>>>> "cap_fsetid",
>>>> "cap_kill",
>>>> "cap_setgid",
>>>> "cap_setuid",
>>>> "cap_setpcap",
>>>> "cap_linux_immutable",
>>>> "cap_net_bind_service",
>>>> "cap_net_broadcast",
>>>> "cap_net_admin",
>>>> "cap_net_raw",
>>>> "cap_ipc_lock",
>>>> "cap_ipc_owner",
>>>> "cap_sys_module",
>>>> "cap_sys_rawio",
>>>> "cap_sys_chroot",
>>>> "cap_sys_ptrace",
>>>> "cap_sys_pacct",
>>>> "cap_sys_admin",
>>>> "cap_sys_boot",
>>>> "cap_sys_nice",
>>>> "cap_sys_resource",
>>>> "cap_sys_time",
>>>> "cap_sys_tty_config",
>>>> "cap_mknod",
>>>> "cap_lease",
>>>> "cap_audit_write",
>>>> "cap_audit_control",
>>>> "cap_setfcap",
>>>> NULL,
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> PAM_EXTERN int
>>>> pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
>>>> int argc, const char **argv)
>>>> {
>>>> struct passwd *pwd;
>>>> char *pos, *buf;
>>>> char *username = NULL;
>>>>
>>>> /* open system logger */
>>>> openlog("pam_cap_bset", LOG_PERROR | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
>>>>
>>>> /* get the unix username */
>>>> if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &username) !=
>>>> PAM_SUCCESS || !username)
>>>> return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
>>>>
>>>> /* get the passwd entry */
>>>> pwd = getpwnam(username);
>>>> if (!pwd)
>>>> return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
>>>>
>>>> /* Is there "cap_drop=" ? */
>>>> pos = strstr(pwd->pw_gecos, "cap_drop=");
>>>> if (pos) {
>>>> buf = strdup(pos + sizeof("cap_drop=") - 1);
>>>> if (!buf)
>>>> return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
>>>> pos = strtok(buf, ",");
>>>> while (pos) {
>>>> int rc, i;
>>>>
>>>> for (i=0; captable[i]; i++) {
>>>> if (!strcmp(pos, captable[i])) {
>>>> rc = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i);
>>>> if (rc < 0) {
>>>> syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s could not drop
>>>> %s (%s)",
>>>> username, captable[i], strerror(errno));
>>>> break;
>>>> }
>>>> syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s drops %s\n",
>>>> username, captable[i]);
>>>> goto next;
>>>> }
>>>> }
>>>> break;
>>>> next:
>>>> pos = strtok(NULL, ",");
>>>> }
>>>> free(buf);
>>>> } else {
>>>> syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s does not have 'cap_drop='
>>>> property", username);
>>>> }
>>>> return PAM_SUCCESS;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> PAM_EXTERN int
>>>> pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
>>>> int argc, const char **argv)
>>>> {
>>>> /* do nothing */
>>>> return PAM_SUCCESS;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> ************************************************************
>>>> -
>>>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
>>>> linux-security-module" in
>>>> the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>> Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (Darwin)
>> Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
>>
>> iD8DBQFHUbHDmwytjiwfWMwRAj5uAJ9+OB8ljQlJAhKW7jxJWrIPa1k2vgCdHFL9
>> 3zXtwGz+cVeThb53/kAmdCs=
>> =OdM7
>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>> -
>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
>> linux-security-module" in
>> the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>>
>
>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (Darwin)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
iD8DBQFHUvY5+bHCR3gb8jsRAvKaAJ9Upbi+vcSoiQnf64qtubbNow4wmgCdGMBb
UneHzcT8FDexDcFhN5c6OK4=
=0XeM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
