Add security checks to make sure we are not attempting to expand the
stack into memory protected by mmap_min_addr
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
** Be very careful applying/rediffing this patch. Standard 3 lines of
context from git diff will misapply the first hunk to expand_upwards
instead of properly in expand_downwards. This patch was generated using
-U 4 to make sure it applies in the correct place. **
mm/mmap.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- kernel-1/mm/mmap.c
+++ kernel-2/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1614,17 +1614,21 @@ static inline int expand_downwards(struc
* so that the anon_vma locking is not a noop.
*/
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ address &= PAGE_MASK;
+ error = security_file_mmap(0, 0, 0, 0, address, 1);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
anon_vma_lock(vma);
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
- address &= PAGE_MASK;
- error = 0;
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
-
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