From: Rasmus Villemoes > Sent: 21 September 2020 11:22 > On 19/09/2020 02.17, Al Viro wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 05:07:43PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >> On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 4:55 PM Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote: > >>> > >>> On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 04:31:33PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >>> > >>>> check_zeroed_user() looks buggy. It does: > >>>> > >>>> if (!user_access_begin(from, size)) > >>>> return -EFAULT; > >>>> > >>>> unsafe_get_user(val, (unsigned long __user *) from, err_fault); > >>>> > >>>> This is wrong if size < sizeof(unsigned long) -- you read outside the > >>>> area you verified using user_access_begin(). > >>> > >>> Read the code immediately prior to that. from will be word-aligned, > >>> and size will be extended accordingly. If the area acceptable for > >>> user_access_begin() ends *NOT* on a word boundary, you have a problem > >>> and I would strongly recommend to seek professional help. > >>> > >>> All reads in that thing are word-aligned and word-sized. So I very > >>> much doubt that your analysis is correct. > >> > >> Maybe -ETOOTIRED, but I seriously question the math in here. Suppose > >> from == (unsigned long *)1 and size == 1. Then align is 1, and we do: > >> > >> from -= align; > >> size += align; > >> > >> So now from = 0 and size = 2. Now we do user_access_begin(0, 2) and > >> then immediately read 4 or 8 bytes. No good. > > > > Could you explain what kind of insane hardware manages to do #PF-related > > checks (including SMAP, whatever) with *sub*WORD* granularity? > > > > If it's OK with 16bit read from word-aligned address, but barfs on 64bit > > one... I want to know what the hell had its authors been smoking. > > > > So, not sure how the above got triggered, but I notice there might be an > edge case in check_zeroed_user(): > > from -= align; > size += align; > > if (!user_read_access_begin(from, size)) > return -EFAULT; > > unsafe_get_user(val, (unsigned long __user *) from, err_fault); > > > Suppose size is (size_t)-3 and align is 3. What's the convention for > access_ok(whatever, 0)? Is that equivalent to access_ok(whatever, 1), or > is it always true (or $ARCH-dependent)?
Doesn't matter, it will be doing access_ok(xxx, 8) regardless of the user-supplied transfer length. > But, AFAICT, no current caller of check_zeroed_user can end up passing > in a size that can overflow to 0. E.g. for the case at hand, size cannot > be more than SIZE_MAX-24. Basically KASAN doesn't like you reading full words and masking off the unused bytes. David - Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)