Al suggested that if we allocate enough space to add in the '\0'
character at the end of our strings, we could just use scnprintf() in
our ->proc_handler functions without having to be fancy about keeping
track of space.  There are a lot of these handlers, so the follow ups
will be separate, but start with allocating the extra byte to handle the
null termination of strings.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jo...@toxicpanda.com>
---
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index 8e19bad83b45..446e7a949025 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -548,6 +548,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, 
void __user *ubuf,
        struct ctl_table *table = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_entry;
        void *kbuf;
        ssize_t error;
+       size_t orig_count = count;
 
        if (IS_ERR(head))
                return PTR_ERR(head);
@@ -577,9 +578,23 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, 
void __user *ubuf,
                        goto out;
                }
        } else {
-               kbuf = kvzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+               /*
+                * To make our lives easier in ->proc_handler, we allocate an
+                * extra byte to allow us to use scnprintf() for handling the
+                * buffer output.  This works properly because scnprintf() will
+                * only return the number of bytes that it was able to write
+                * out, _NOT_ including the NULL byte.  This means the handler's
+                * will only ever return a maximum of count as what they've
+                * copied.
+                *
+                * HOWEVER, we do not assume that ->proc_handlers are without
+                * bugs, so further down we'll do an extra check to make sure
+                * that count isn't larger than the orig_count.
+                */
+               kbuf = kvzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
                if (!kbuf)
                        goto out;
+               count += 1;
        }
 
        error = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_SYSCTL(head, table, write, &kbuf, &count,
@@ -593,6 +608,13 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, 
void __user *ubuf,
                goto out_free_buf;
 
        if (!write) {
+               /*
+                * This shouldn't happen, but those are the last words before
+                * somebody adds a security vulnerability, so just make sure
+                * that count isn't larger than orig_count.
+                */
+               if (count > orig_count)
+                       count = orig_count;
                error = -EFAULT;
                if (copy_to_user(ubuf, kbuf, count))
                        goto out_free_buf;
-- 
2.24.1

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