Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Peter Dolding wrote: > > On 11/1/07, Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> --- Peter Dolding <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Posix capabilities predate SELinux. SELinux is not interested in > >> Posix capabilities. > >> > >>> But no IBM had to do it. > >> Err, no. It was done by Andrew Morgan back in the dark ages. > >> Why on earth do you think IBM did it? > > > > Posix file capabilities the option to replace SUID bit with something > > more security safe only handing out segments of root power instead of > > the complete box and dice like SUID. Even different on a user by user > > base. > > > > Posix capabilites is what Posix file capabilities is based on. Yes I > > know the words appear close. The word file is important. Please read > > Website. http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/l-posixcap.html > > For the record, I think you are both right. I took a stab at it back > when Casey and I first met: > > ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/old/kernel-2.4-fcap/README > > all that stuff worked fine it was just a bit ahead of its time... > > - From memory, at that point in time "extended attributes" were an > external patch, and having some trouble getting merged. My sense was > that EA was a pre-requisite and I was happy to wait for that support to > become integrated before pushing my file capability support. > > In the midst of all this LSM emerged as a reaction to Linus' clear > unhappiness about all extensions security. I didn't have the time to > participate in the LSM, and my work sat in the form of these patches. > > SELinux at that time existed as a separate infrastructure, and evidently > did have the time to embrace LSM. > > > IBM coders worked and got it into the main line really recently to > > provide at least some way to avoid fault of SUID of course it could > > [...] > > So, yes, IBM (Serge) deserve full credit for starting over, and getting > it merged...
There are still pieces to line up. Note that Andrew Morgan is working on a patch to make the securebits per-process to make capabilities more useful as well as a 64-bit capability patch. And the support in tree to date would be riddled with gotchas without Andrew Morgan's, Stephen Smalley's, and Casey Schaufler's input. -serge (But hey, thanks :) - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/