On 7/30/2020 8:02 AM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> On 2020-07-29 20:47:21, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
>> Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to
>> enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and
>> policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and
>> that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is
>> required for handling this measurement.
>>
>> Define two new IMA policy func namely LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY to
>> measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules.
If, as you suggest below, this is SELinux specific,
these should be SELINUX_STATE and SELINUX_POLICY.
It makes me very uncomfortable when I see LSM used
in cases where SELinux is required. The LSM is supposed
to be an agnostic interface, so if you need to throw
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) &&
into the IMA code you're clearly not thinking in terms
of the LSM layer. I have no problem with seeing SELinux
oriented and/or specific code in IMA if that's what you want.
Just don't call it LSM.
>> Update ima_match_rules() and ima_validate_rule() to check for
>> the new func and ima_parse_rule() to handle the new func.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nra...@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 ++++++++
>> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>> 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> index cd572912c593..b7c7fb548c0c 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
>> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Description:
>> [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
>> [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
>> [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK]
>> + [LSM_STATE] [LSM_POLICY]
>> mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
>> [[^]MAY_EXEC]
>> fsmagic:= hex value
>> @@ -125,3 +126,11 @@ Description:
>> keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring:
>>
>> measure func=KEY_CHECK
>> keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima
>> +
>> + Example of measure rule using LSM_STATE to measure LSM state:
>> +
>> + measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
>> +
>> + Example of measure rule using LSM_POLICY to measure LSM policy:
>> +
>> + measure func=LSM_POLICY template=ima-ng
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> index 38043074ce5e..1b5f4b2f17d0 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> @@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
>> hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \
>> hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \
>> hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
>> + hook(LSM_STATE, lsm_state) \
>> + hook(LSM_POLICY, lsm_policy) \
>> hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
>>
>> #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>> index 4f39fb93f278..8c8b4e4a6493 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>> @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned
>> char *filename,
>> * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
>> * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
>> * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
>> - * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK
>> + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | LSM_STATE | LSM_POLICY
>> * mask: contains the permission mask
>> * fsmagic: hex value
>> *
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 07f033634b27..a0f5c39d9084 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -442,13 +442,20 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry
>> *rule, struct inode *inode,
>> {
>> int i;
>>
>> - if (func == KEY_CHECK) {
>> - return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) &&
>> - ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
>> - }
>> if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
>> (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
>> return false;
>> +
>> + switch (func) {
>> + case KEY_CHECK:
>> + return ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
>> + case LSM_STATE:
>> + case LSM_POLICY:
>> + return true;
>> + default:
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
>> (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
>> return false;
>> @@ -1044,6 +1051,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry
>> *entry)
>> if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
>> return false;
>>
>> + break;
>> + case LSM_STATE:
>> + case LSM_POLICY:
>> + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> break;
>> default:
>> return false;
>> @@ -1176,6 +1195,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct
>> ima_rule_entry *entry)
>> entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
>> else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
>> entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
>> + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0)
>> + entry->func = LSM_STATE;
>> + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0)
>> + entry->func = LSM_POLICY;
> This patch generally looks really good to me with the exception of one
> thing...
>
> We should only accept rules with these specified hook functions when an
> LSM that has measurement support is enabled. This messes up the ordering
> of your patch series but it could be as simple as doing this:
>
> else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) &&
> strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0)
> entry->func = LSM_STATE;
>
> Or you could do something a little more complex, like what's done with
> CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES. You could create a CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSM option
> that's default enabled but depends on CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX and then
> check for IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSM) in ima_parse_rule().
>
> I'd personally opt for just placing the
> IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) check directly into
> ima_parse_rule().
>
> Tyler
>
>> else
>> result = -EINVAL;
>> if (!result)
>> --
>> 2.27.0
