From: Mathias Krause <mini...@googlemail.com>
commit 2f30ea5090cbc57ea573cdc66421264b3de3fb0a upstream.
When we fail to attach the security context in xfrm_state_construct()
we'll return 0 as error value which, in turn, will wrongly claim success
to userland when, in fact, we won't be adding / updating the XFRM state.
This is a regression introduced by commit fd21150a0fe1 ("[XFRM] netlink:
Inline attach_encap_tmpl(), attach_sec_ctx(), and attach_one_addr()").
Fix it by propagating the error returned by security_xfrm_state_alloc()
in this case.
Fixes: fd21150a0fe1 ("[XFRM] netlink: Inline attach_encap_tmpl()...")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <mini...@googlemail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tg...@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klass...@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -609,9 +609,12 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con
if (err)
goto error;
- if (attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX] &&
- security_xfrm_state_alloc(x, nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX])))
- goto error;
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]) {
+ err = security_xfrm_state_alloc(x,
+ nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]));
+ if (err)
+ goto error;
+ }
if ((err = xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(&x->replay_esn, &x->preplay_esn,
attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL])))
