* Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com> [2020-04-29 05:52:05]: > > > So it seems that with modern Linux, all one needs > > > to do on x86 is mark the device as untrusted. > > > It's already possible to do this with ACPI and with OF - would that be > > > sufficient for achieving what this patchset is trying to do? > > > > In my case, its not sufficient to just mark virtio device untrusted and thus > > activate the use of swiotlb. All of the secondary VM memory, including those > > allocate by swiotlb driver, is private to it. > > So why not make the bounce buffer memory shared then?
Its a limitation by our hypervisor. When a secondary VM is created, two memory segments are allocated - one private and other shared. There is no provision for the secondary VM to make part of its private memory shared after it boots. I can perhaps consider a change in swiotlb driver to accept the second shared memory segment as its main working area (rather than allocate its own). That would still not work I think where swiotlb is used for pass-thr devices (when private memory is fine) as well as virtio devices (when shared memory is required). -- QUALCOMM INDIA, on behalf of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum, hosted by The Linux Foundation
