On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 10:39:51AM -0700, Stephen Boyd wrote:
> Quoting Hsin-Yi Wang (2019-08-22 00:15:22)
> > Introducing a chosen node, rng-seed, which is an entropy that can be
> > passed to kernel called very early to increase initial device
> > randomness. Bootloader should provide this entropy and the value is
> > read from /chosen/rng-seed in DT.
> >
> > Obtain of_fdt_crc32 for CRC check after early_init_dt_scan_nodes(),
> > since early_init_dt_scan_chosen() would modify fdt to erase rng-seed.
> >
> > Add a new interface add_bootloader_randomness() for rng-seed use case.
> > Depends on whether the seed is trustworthy, rng seed would be passed to
> > add_hwgenerator_randomness(). Otherwise it would be passed to
> > add_device_randomness(). Decision is controlled by kernel config
> > RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsi...@chromium.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swb...@chromium.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <r...@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > Change from v8:
> > * Add a new interface add_bootloader_randomness
> > * Add a new kernel config
> > ---
> > drivers/char/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
> > drivers/char/random.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> > drivers/of/fdt.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
> > include/linux/random.h | 1 +
> > 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
> > index 96156c729a31..5974a5906fd0 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
> > +++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
> > @@ -551,3 +551,13 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
> > has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's
> > random number generation facilities. This can also be configured
> > at boot with "random.trust_cpu=on/off".
> > +
> > +config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
> > + bool "Trust the bootloader to initialize Linux's CRNG"
> > + default n
>
> You can drop the default.
>
> > + help
> > + Bootloader could provide rng-seed set in /chosen/rng-seed in DT to
> > help
> > + increase initial device randomness. Assume the entropy provided is
> > + trustworthy, it would be regarded as true hardware RNGs and update
> > the
> > + entropy estimate. Otherwise it would be regarded as device input
> > that
> > + could help mix the entropy pool, but won't be added to actual
> > entropy.
>
> Maybe reword this to something like:
>
> Some bootloaders can provide entropy to increase the kernel's
> initial device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy
> provided by the booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to
> the kernel's entropy pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be
> regarded as device input that only mixes the entropy pool.
>
> > \ No newline at end of file
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> > index 5d5ea4ce1442..29d3ff3de1e1 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> > @@ -2445,3 +2445,18 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer,
> > size_t count,
> > credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
> > +
> > +/* Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
> > + * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs.
> > Otherwise
> > + * it would be regarded as device data.
> > + * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
> > + */
> > +void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
> > +{
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
Can this please be a boot param (with the default controlled by the
CONFIG)? See how CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is wired up...
-Kees
> > + add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
> > +#else
> > + add_device_randomness(buf, size);
> > +#endif
>
> Maybe use
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
> add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
> else
> add_device_randomness(buf, size);
>
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
> > \ No newline at end of file
--
Kees Cook
