On Thu, Aug 30, 2007 at 11:04:00AM -0400, Trond Myklebust wrote: > With CIFS or other password based protocols (including RPCSEC_GSS)
Well, rpcsec_gss isn't inherently password based, and you can authenticate in some way that doesn't actually give away your password (or other long-lived credential). > What I'm saying is that the superuser can pretty much do whatever it > takes to grab either your kerberos password (e.g. install a keyboard > listener), a stored credential (read the contents of your kerberos > on-disk credential cache), or s/he can access the cached contents of the > file by hunting through /dev/kmem. > > IOW: There is no such thing as security on a root-compromised machine. And in theory a kernel could provide *some* guarantees against root, right? (Is there some reason a unix-like kernel must provide such things as /dev/kmem?) --b. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
