On Mon, Aug 27, 2007 at 10:09:42AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Adrian Bunk ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> > On Fri, Aug 24, 2007 at 08:50:10PM -0700, Andrew Morgan wrote:
> > >
> > > FWIW, in the mm kernel, I've actually already removed them when one
> > > configures without capabilities.
> > >
> > > http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.23-rc3/2.6.23-rc3-mm1/broken-out/v3-file-capabilities-alter-behavior-of-cap_setpcap.patch
> > >
> > > Other than writing a custom module, so far as I can tell, there is/was
> > > no way to set them anyway.
> > >
> > > I'd obviously prefer to wait for the mm-merge process to complete and
> > > minimize the churn in this area, but I basically agree that the bits as
> > > implemented are pretty useless in their current form. In a per-process
> > > mode (with filesystem capability support) they are much more useful...
> >
> > It was in the tree for nine years (sic) without a single user...
>
> That's because without file capabilities there was no way for a process
> to retain capabilities across exec, so not having a privileged root user
> was simply not workable.
>
> > Are you only improving a dead horse, or do you also have a rider for the
> > improved dead horse?
>
> It will allow process trees to run with strict capabilities, without a
> root user which automatically gains full capabilities. That wasn't
> possible without file capabilities, since there was no way for processes
> to retain capabilities across exec. Now that we have file capabilities,
> it is feasible, and it certainly is useful.
I didn't question that the dead horse gets improved, but where's the
rider?
A user of the improved securebits has to be submitted for inclusion in
the kernel.
> -serge
cu
Adrian
--
"Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out
of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days.
"Only a promise," Lao Er said.
Pearl S. Buck - Dragon Seed
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