The idx in do_get_thread_area() is controlled by userspace via syscall: ptrace(defined in kernel/ptrace.c), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The idx can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.
Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index p->thread.tls_array. Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangch...@gmail.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c index a5b802a..e3dc05b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <linux/user.h> #include <linux/regset.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/desc.h> @@ -220,15 +221,19 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, struct user_desc __user *u_info) { struct user_desc info; + int index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN; if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number)) return -EFAULT; - if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX) + if (index < 0 || index > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN) return -EINVAL; + index = array_index_nospec(index, + GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1); + fill_user_desc(&info, idx, - &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]); + &p->thread.tls_array[index]); if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info))) return -EFAULT; -- 2.7.4