3.16.66-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebigg...@google.com>
commit 4aa68e07d845562561f5e73c04aa521376e95252 upstream.
When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.
Following commit 34dbbcdbf633 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebigg...@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk>
---
security/keys/proc.c | 8 ++------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_fil
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = key->type,
.index_key.description = key->description,
- .cred = current_cred(),
+ .cred = m->file->f_cred,
.match = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data = key,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
@@ -213,11 +213,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_fil
}
}
- /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming
- * non-possession)
- * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
- * access to __current_cred() safe
- */
+ /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
