On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 12:57 PM Xing, Cedric <cedric.x...@intel.com> wrote:
>
> > Using the untrusted stack as a way to exchange data is very convenient,
> > but that doesn't mean it's a good idea. Here are some problems it
> > causes:
> >
> > - It prevents using a normal function to wrap enclave entry (as we're
> > seeing with this patch set).
>
> It doesn't prevent. It's all about what's agreed between the enclave and its
> hosting process. With the optional "exit/exception callback" set to null,
> this will behave exactly the same as in the current patch. That's what I
> meant by "flexibility" and "superset of functionality".
>
> >
> > - It makes quite a few unfortunate assumptions about the layout of the
> > untrusted stack. It assumes that the untrusted stack is arbitrarily
> > expandable, which is entirely untrue in languages like Go.
>
> I'm with you that stack is not always good thing, hence I'm NOT ruling out
> any other approaches for exchanging data. But is stack "bad" enough to be
> ruled out completely? The point here is flexibility because the stack could
> be "good" for its convenience. After all, only buffers of "reasonable" sizes
> will be exchanged in most cases, and in the rare exceptions of stack overflow
> they'd probably get caught in validation anyway. The point here again is -
> flexibility. I'd say it's better to leave the choice to the SDK implementers
> than to force the choice on them.
>
> > It assumes that the untrusted stack isn't further constrained by various
> > CFI mechanisms (e.g. CET), and, as of last time I checked, the
> > interaction between CET and SGX was still not specified.
>
> I was one of the architects participating in the CET ISA definition. The
> assembly provided was crafted with CET in mind and will be fully compatible
> with CET.
>
> > It also
> > assumes that the untrusted stack doesn't have ABI-imposed layout
> > restrictions related to unwinding, and, as far as I know, this means
> > that current enclaves with current enclave runtimes can interact quite
> > poorly with debuggers, exception handling, and various crash dumping
> > technologies.
>
> Per comments from the patch set, I guess it's been agreed that this vDSO
> function will NOT be x86_64 ABI compatible. So I'm not sure why stacking
> unwinding is relevant here. However, I'm with you that we should take
> debugging/exception handling/reporting/crash dumping into consideration by
> making this vDSO API x86_64 ABI compatible. IMO it's trivial and the
> performance overhead in negligible (dwarfed by ENCLU anyway. I'd be more than
> happy to provide a x86_64 ABI compatible version if that's also your
> preference.
>
> > - It will make it quite unpleasant to call into an enclave in a
> > coroutine depending on how the host untrusted runtime implements
> > coroutines.
>
> I'm not sure what you are referring to by "coroutine". But this vDSO API will
> be (expected to be) the only routine that actually calls into an enclave.
> Isn't that correct?
I mean use in languages and runtimes that allow a function and its
callees to pause and then resume later. Something like (pseudocode,
obviously):
void invoke_the_enclave()
{
do_eenter_through_vdso();
}
void some_ocall_handler(void *ptr)
{
yield;
}
If the enclave has ptr pointing to the untrusted stack, then this gets
quite awkward for the runtime to handle efficiently. IMO a much nicer
approach would be:
void invoke_the_enclave()
{
char buffer[1024];
while (true)
{
eenter (through vdso);
if (exit was an ocall request) {
some_ocall_handler(buffer);
}
}
}
And now there is nothing funny happening behind the runtime's back
when some_ocall_handler tries to yield.
