Andrew Morton wrote: > On Wed, 01 Aug 2007 00:22:38 +0200 Frank Benkstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> I wonder why there are different permissions needed for VT_PROCESS >> (access to the current virtual console) and VT_LOCKSWITCH >> (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG). >> > Perhaps the issue with VT_LOCKSWITCH is that its effects will persist after > the user has logged out? So user A is effectively altering user B's > console, hence suitable capabilities are needed? > > Is the current code actually causing any observable problem?
Both controls can be used to deny service to other users. For example: user B locks his X session or current console and walks off to lunch. User A walks up to user B's machine, switches to another console, logs in and execs program_that_does_vt_process. User B will not be able to continue work unless he/she can get user A or someone with CAP_KILL to kill the program. If remote logins aren't allowed, the only way I see to use the machine again is to reboot. I think VT_PROCESS (or VT_SETMODE respectively) should be protected with the same level of security as VT_LOCKSWITCH, i.e. CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
