Neil Horman wrote: > Ok, here we go > > As promised, I'm reposting the core_pattern enhancements I've done over the > past > few days. These three patches replace and conintue the work contained in the > following patches, and can replace them: > update-coredump-path-in-kernel-to-not-check-coredump-rlim-if-core_pattern-is-a-pipe.patch > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe.patch > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix.patch > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2.patch > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-fix.patch > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-sparc64-fix.patch > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-sparc64-fix.patch [...]
You may want to improve your patches with style-related changes, including removing trailing spaces, using tabs instead of spaces, and defining pointers like char *ptr instead of char * ptr. Also, it is probably good to think how we can "drop privileges" while piping the core dump output to an external program. A malicious user can potentially use it as a possible backdoor since anything that is executed by "|program" will be executed with root privileges. Eugene - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
