@Nick. Would mind giving this patch an "Acked-by"? This issue causes any Android who uses latest kernel cannot mount proc with "hidepid=2" option. Which causes problems 程洋 <d17103...@gmail.com> 于2018年12月5日周三 下午3:26写道： > > Anyone who can review my patch? > > 程洋 <chengy...@xiaomi.com> 于2018年11月30日周五 上午10:34写道： > > > > Here is an article illustrates the details. > > https://medium.com/@topjohnwu/from-anime-game-to-android-system-security-vulnerability-9b955a182f20 > > > > And There is a similar fix on kernel-4.4: > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=99663be772c827b8f5f594fe87eb4807be1994e5 > > > > Q: Other filesystems parse the options from fill_super(). Is proc special > > in some fashion? > > A: According to my research, start_kernel will call proc_mount first, and > > initialize sb->s_root before any userspace process runs. If others want to > > mount it, all options will be ignored. > > AOSP change here: > > https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/core/+/181345/4/init/init.cpp > > At first I though we should mount it with MS_REMOUNT flag. But kernel > > will crash if we did this. > > > > Q: Why is this considered to be security sensitive? I can guess, but I'd > > like to know your reasoning. > > A: See the article above. It's part of Android sanbox. > > > > > > > [PATCH] Security: Handle hidepid option correctly > > > > Why is this considered to be security sensitive? I can guess, but I'd like > > to know your reasoning. > > > > On Thu, 29 Nov 2018 19:08:21 +0800 mailto:d17103...@gmail.com wrote: > > > > > From: Cheng Yang <mailto:chengy...@xiaomi.com> > > > > > > The proc_parse_options() call from proc_mount() runs only once at boot > > > time. So on any later mount attempt, any mount options are ignored > > > because ->s_root is already initialized. > > > As a consequence, "mount -o <options>" will ignore the options. The > > > only way to change mount options is "mount -o remount,<options>". > > > To fix this, parse the mount options unconditionally. > > > > > > --- a/fs/proc/inode.c > > > +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c > > > @@ -493,13 +493,9 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct super_block > > > *sb, struct proc_dir_entry *de) > > > > > > int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, int silent) { > > > -struct pid_namespace *ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info); > > > struct inode *root_inode; > > > int ret; > > > > > > -if (!proc_parse_options(data, ns)) > > > -return -EINVAL; > > > - > > > /* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */ > > > s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV; > > > s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOSUID | SB_NOEXEC; diff --git > > > a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index f4b1a9d..f5f3bf3 100644 > > > --- a/fs/proc/root.c > > > +++ b/fs/proc/root.c > > > @@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct > > > file_system_type *fs_type, > > > ns = task_active_pid_ns(current); > > > } > > > > > > +if (!proc_parse_options(data, ns)) > > > +return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); > > > + > > > return mount_ns(fs_type, flags, data, ns, ns->user_ns, > > > proc_fill_super); } > > > > Other filesystems parse the options from fill_super(). Is proc special in > > some fashion? > > > > #/******本邮件及其附件含有小米公司的保密信息，仅限于发送给上面地址中列出的个人或群组。禁止任何其他人以任何形式使用（包括但不限于全部或部分地泄露、复制、或散发）本邮件中的信息。如果您错收了本邮件，请您立即电话或邮件通知发件人并删除本邮件！ > > This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from > > XIAOMI, which is intended only for the person or entity whose address is > > listed above. Any use of the information contained herein in any way > > (including, but not limited to, total or partial disclosure, reproduction, > > or dissemination) by persons other than the intended recipient(s) is > > prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender > > by phone or email immediately and delete it!******/#
